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ABSTRACT
It is not the case -- as is widely assumed -- that only
sentences can be used to make assertions: speakers can
also make assertions by uttering ordinary words and
phrases in isolation. That is the central claim of
this dissertation.
This claim is in conflict with certain familiar
philosophical doctrines. In particular, we consider:
(a) Dummett's view that to assert just is to say an
assertoric sentence under conventionally specified
conditions; (b) Gareth Evans' idea that, to say that P,
it is at least required that the words used express the
thought that P (in the circumstances of use); (c)
Frege's so-called context principle, according to which
words have meaning only in the context of a sentence;
(d) Russell's theory of definite descriptions.
Having argued that the assertoric use of words and
phrases is in conflict with these philosophical
doctrines, we consider a defense of these views, to the
effect that every assertoric utterance of an (apparent)
word or phrase in isolation is actually an utterance of
an elliptical sentence. In Chapter Three, we consider
the syntactic ellipsis hypothesis, according to which
the utterances in question have sentential Syntactic
Structures. In Chapter Four, we consider the semantic
ellipsis hypothesis: the hypothesis that the
expressions produced are not syntactic sentences, but
nevertheless have illocutionary force and express
propositions. We argue that neither of these ellipsis
hypotheses offers a satisfactory account of the way
speakers can and do use (apparent) words and phrases in
isolation. We conclude, therefore, that the defense
fails and that speakers can make assertions using words
and phrases in isolation.
Thesis Supervisor: Sylvain Bromberger
Title: Professor of Philosophy
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CHAPTER ONE: WORDS, PHRASES AND PHILOSOPHY
A sentence is, as we have said, the
smallest unit of language with
which a linguistic act can be
accomplished, with which 'a move
can be made in the language game':
so you cannot do anything with a
word -- cannot effect any
conventional (linguistic) act by
uttering it -- save by uttering
some sentence containing that
word... (Dummett 1973: 194)
1 Introduction
1.1 The Thesis and The Counter Thesis
The central claim of this dissertation is given in
(1). Having no better name for it, we label it the
Thesis.
(1) The Thesis: Speakers can make assertions by
uttering ordinary words and phrases in isolation.1
The Thesis is to be contrasted with the following
Counter Thesis:
I We believe that words and phrases in isolation can also be
used to ask questions, issue orders, and so on. Indeed, a great
variety of speech acts can be performed by uttering a word or
phrase in isolation. However, because of the particular
philosophical implications we wish to draw, we focus exclusively
on assertion.
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(2) The Counter Thesis: Speakers can make assertions
only by uttering sentences.
Ordinary words and phrases are not sentences.2
Hence if the Counter Thesis is true, speakers cannot
make assertions by uttering ordinary words and phrases.
If the Thesis is true, on the other hand, then speakers
can make assertions by uttering ordinary words and
phrases -- hence sentences are not the only expressions
which can be used to make assertions. In brief: the
Thesis and the Counter Thesis are incompatible.
As we shall shortly see, the Thesis is prima facie
in conflict with certain familiar philosophical
doctrines. It is therefore important to establish
conclusively whether it is the Thesis or the Counter
Thesis that is correct.
1.2 Two Arguments for the Thesis
Broadly speaking we will present -- in the
chapters that follow -- two arguments for the Thesis.
2 As we shall see in Chapter Two, sentences are now commonly
treated as Inflectional Phrases. For ease of exposition,
however, we will use the expression "phrase" in the more
traditional manner. In our usage, "phrase" refers to (what are
now called) lexical phrases. Hence, given this terminology,
sentences are not phrases.
14
One argument runs as follows. As a matter of
empirical fact, speakers actually do make assertions by
uttering ordinary words and phrases in isolation. That
speakers actually do make assertions by uttering
ordinary words and phrases in isolation entails that
speakers can make assertions by uttering ordinary words
and phrases in isolation.
In the second argument we demonstrate that a
typical speaker is able to use the ordinary phrase
"John's father" in isolation to make an assertion --
regardless of whether he does so use this phrase. The
same demonstration could be given, mutatis mutandis,
for a multitude of ordinary words and phrases. Hence
speakers are able to use any number of ordinary words
and phrases in isolation to make assertions. (This
argument appears in Chapter Five.)
1.2.1 A Reply to Argument One: The Ellipsis Hypothesis
In Chapters Three and Four we consider a reply to
the first argument; a reply to the effect that speakers
do not, in fact, make assertions by uttering ordinary
words and phrases in isolation. According to this
reply, it is true that:
15
(3) The Data: It appears that speakers make assertions
by uttering ordinary words and phrases in isolation.
But one should not draw the conclusion that:
(4) The Premise: Speakers actually do make assertions
by uttering ordinary words and phrases in isolation.
That is because the ellipsis hypothesis is true:
(5) The Ellipsis Hypothesis: Whenever a speaker makes
an assertion by uttering an (apparent) word or phrase
in isolation, what that speaker really utters is an
elliptical sentence.
According to the ellipsis hypothesis, speakers
merely appear to make assertions by uttering ordinary
words and phrases in isolation. And, to establish the
Thesis, mere appearances are not enough. In a word:
the proponent of the ellipsis hypothesis grants that
(3) is true -- but (3) does not entail the Thesis. The
proponent of the ellipsis hypothesis also grants that
(4) entails the Thesis; but he denies that (4) is true.
For our first argument -- i.e. the argument from
the actual assertoric use of words and phrases -- to
16
succeed then, the ellipsis hypothesis must be shown to
be false.
1.2.2 Several Examples
Examples (6) through (9) illustrate the dispute
between proponents of the Thesis and proponents of the
ellipsis hypothesis. In each of the described
situations, a word or phrase at least appears to be
used in isolation to make an assertion. This much is
common ground. The question is: is this mere
appearance or not?
(6) [Two people are talking at a party. Mary points to
a man near the door and says]
John's father
(7) [A student is receiving instruction in painting.
Her teacher Mary looks at the current canvas and says]
Nice work
(8) [A boat speeds by. Mary, a spectator, says]
Very fast
(9) [A letter arrives. Mary looks at the envelope, and
says]
17
From Spain
According to proponents of the Thesis, in each of
the above situations Mary produced an ordinary phrase
in isolation. That is. Mary uttered an expression
which also appears as an intermediate constituent in
simple sentences.3 Therefore, in each of these
situations Mary did not produce a sentence -- not even
an elliptical sentence -- but Mary did make an
assertion.
According to proponents of the ellipsis
hypothesis, on the other hand, these are not cases of
making an assertion by uttering ordinary phrases. It
is true that, in each of the described situations, Mary
appears to produce a phrase in isolation; but what she
really utters in each case is some elliptical sentence.
Importantly, when a proponent of the ellipsis
hypothesis says, e.g. that Mary really produced an
elliptical sentence, he does not mean merely that the
proposition which Mary asserts outstrips the meaning of
the word or phrase Mary (appears to) utter. On this
point, proponents of the Thesis and the ellipsis
3 A more precise definition of the word "phrase" is provided
in Chapter Two.
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hypothesis are in agreement. Both acknowledge, for
example, that in uttering (9) Mary asserts that the
letter is from Spain, while (appearing to) say an
ordinary phrase (i.e. "from Spain") that does not
express this proposition.
Proponents of the Thesis and the ellipsis
hypothesis differ with respect to the structure and
meaning of the expressions uttered. According to
proponents of the Thesis, speakers really produce
ordinary words and phrases, with the meaning and
structure of ordinary words and phrases. In (9), for
example, Mary produced the Prepositional Phrase "from
Spain" whose meaning is that property had by objects
from Spain.
According to the proponents of the ellipsis
hypothesis, on the other hand, in (9) the speaker
produced not the phrase "from Spain", but rather some
elliptical sentence that sounds exactly like this
phrase -- but is semantically and syntactically
distinct from it. (This characterization of
"elliptical sentence" is rough and ready. It will be
refined and spelled out in detail in Chapters Three and
Four.)
19
1.2.3 Summary of the First Argument
To sum up the first argument for the Thesis. We
can safely infer the Premise from the Data -- unless
the ellipsis hypothesis is true.
(3) The Data: It appears that speakers make assertions
by uttering ordinary words and phrases in isolation.
(4) The Premise: Speakers actually do make assertions
by uttering ordinary words and phrases in isolation.
But, as a matter of fact, the ellipsis hypothesis
is not true. (We argue for this in Chapters Three and
Four.) So, we conclude that the Premise is true. Now:
that speakers actually do assertorically utter ordinary
words and phrases entails that speakers can
assertorically utter ordinary words and phrases.
Therefore, the Thesis is true.
(1) The Thesis: Speakers can make assertions by
uttering ordinary words and phrases in isolation.
20
2 Words, Phrases and Philosophy
In what follows, we introduce a number of
philosophical doctrines which are incompatible with the
Thesis. We will not argue that these doctrines can in
no way be rendered compatible with the assertoric use
of words and phrases; whether the views can be
repaired, and made compatible with the Thesis, will be
left as an open question. What will surface, however,
is that the use of words and phrases to make statements
raises important problems for these soon-to-be
discussed views.
By discussing only these four doctrines, we do not
mean to suggest that these are the only philosophical
theses which are incompatible with the assertoric use
of words and phrases. They are merely a sampling. We
present them in alphabetical order, by author.
2.1 Dummett on Assertion
In his landmark Frege: Philosophy of Language,
Michael Dummett rejects the Grice-inspired analysis of
assertion, according to which assertion is an exterior
21
manifestation of certain complex intentions.4 Dummett
believes, instead, that assertion should be viewed as a
conventional action, on par with promising, bringing
down a verdict, or doubling in bridge. We call this
Dummett's general claim about assertion.
(10) Dummett's General Claim: Assertion should not be
analyzed as the exterior manifestation of certain
complex intentions. Rather, assertion should be viewed
as a conventional action.
Dummett also introduces a specific analysis of
assertion -- an analysis which is convention based.
According to Dummett's specific analysis, assertion
consists in the saying of assertoric sentences under
conventionally specified conditions. We call this
Dummett's specific claim about assertion.
(11) Dummett's Specific Claim: Assertion just is the
saying of assertoric sentences under conventionally
specified conditions.
4 We say "Grice-inspired" because Grice himself does not fit
comfortably in either camp. With Dummett, Grice (1975) believed
that what is said is determined by convention; but Grice (1957)
further believed that the conventional meaning of words and
sentences rests upon intentions. Here he parts ways with
Dummett.
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In the discussion that follows, we will focus on
Dummett's specific claim. Our conclusion will be that
it is prima facie incompatible with the Thesis. In
this short space, we evidently will not be able to say
much about Dummett's general claim. The dispute
between intention based approaches (e.g. Donnellan
(1968), Davidson (1979, 1982, 1986)) on the one hand,
and convention based approaches (e.g. Dummett (1973))
on the other needs to be decided; but it will not be
decided here.
Before we present Dummett's (1973) views about
assertion in detail, some cursory remarks are in order
about Dummett's larger philosophical projects, and the
place that assertion plays in them.
Truth, according to Dummett, just is correct
assertion. This extremely intimate link between truth
and assertion is pivotal for Dummett because, according
to him, there are many sentences which realists have
held to be true, but which cannot be correctly
asserted.
Many sentences about the past simply cannot be
verified; similarly, one cannot verify sentences like,
"Beyond allowing scientists to make predictions, there
23
really are black holes and anti-matter"; also
unverifiable are sentences which state that there are
physical objects which exist independently of our
perception of them. Such sentences, according to
Dummett, cannot be correctly asserted and hence are not
true.
The same reasoning applies to mathematics: Dummett
maintains that mathematical sentences which cannot be
proven cannot be correctly asserted. Hence, if Dummett
is right to identify truth with correct assertion, then
unprovable mathematical statements are not true. In a
word: Dummett's view that truth is correct assertion
leads him to anti-realism in many different domains.
Dummett also thinks that these unverifiable
sentences cannot be correctly denied either.
Therefore, they are not false. So, if we grant Dummett
his analysis of truth as correct assertion, then there
are some sentences which are neither true nor false.
Exit the principle of bi-valence. And with it, the law
of the excluded middle -- and classical logic.
Dummett also uses assertion to characterize mental
states, such as believing that P or intending that P.
Like Wittgenstein (1953), Dummett wants to banish
24
occult interior states by appealing to public
practices; e.g. the practice of asserting. Or, to put
it in a less misleading way: it is not so much that
Dummett wishes to do away with notions like "believes
that" and "intends that". But he does want to ground
them in a public phenomenon.
For example: to say that a subject believes some
proposition P is, for Dummett, to say that the subject
has the disposition to sincerely assert that P.
Assertion, for Dummett, is a public phenomenon. Hence
beliefs (and other mental states) need not be
characterized as private interior states at all, but
rather as public (dispositional) ones.
Parts of Dummnett's program are very attractive.
It would be wonderful to explicate mental vocabulary in
terms of outward behaviors and community practices. We
should also welcome a persuasive and substantive theory
of truth. Dummett's anti-realist conclusions and his
rejection of classical logic, on the other hand, may
seem rather unpalatable. Nevertheless, one cannot deny
that establishing such conclusions would be an
important philosophical achievement.
For these philosophical projects to succeed,
25
however, it is critical that Dummett provide an
adequate account of assertion. It is not enough to
make the general point that assertion is a conventional
action -- a specific proposal must be given, and it
must be satisfactory. The analysis Dummett actually
presents, though, cannot be right -- if the Thesis is
true.
Let us now turn to Dummett's specific views on
assertion.
2.1.1 Against Intention Based Approaches
Dummett presents, and then criticizes, the
following intention based analysis of assertion:
(12) Intention Based Analysis of Assertion: A speaker S
asserts that P if and only if:
(a) S utters an expression whose sense is P
(b) S at least pretends to have the intention of saying
something true
(c) The intention to pretend to say something true is
her primary intention in speaking
(d) S intends that, if P is not true, she must either
retract her assertion or make it the case that P
26
Condition (a) guarantees that a thought has been
expressed. But merely to express a thought is not yet
to assert it. According to Dummett,
Judgment is to grasping a thought as
assertion is to the expression of a thought.
Merely to have a thought -- in the sense of
grasping it and fixing one's attention on it
-- is different from judging that that
thought is true -- from doing what Frege
calls 'advancing from the thought to the
truth-value'. This difference is the same
difference as that between merely expressing
the thought, without intending to be
understood as claiming that it is true, and
asserting it. (Dummett 1973: 298)
To be asserting, it might be thought, a speaker
must be trying to say something true. But, in fact,
intending to say something true is not a necessary
condition for asserting. As Dummett rightly observes,
a speaker may intend to say something false; or she may
intend to say something about whose truth or falsity
she has no opinion. But, says Dummett, "In none of
these cases does the fact that [the speaker] does not
have the intention to say something true make it false
to say that he has made an assertion". (Dummett 1973:
27
299)
According to the intention based analysis of
assertion that Dummett criticizes, then, for a speaker
to make an assertion it is not necessary that she
intend to say something true; but the speaker must at
least pretend that she has the intention of saying
something true. This is condition (b).
But this still does not yield sufficient
conditions for assertion. According to Dummett, for
someone to be asserting it is necessary that her
primary intention in speaking be to say something true.
He supposes, for example, that a man who recited a line
of poetry both because it was pleasant sounding and
because he thought it true would be asserting only if
his primary intention was to say something true. If,
for example, the man would have uttered the line
regardless of its truth, then his primary intention
would not be to say something true and hence, according,
to Dummett, he would not be asserting. Dummett
therefore adds condition (c): to assert, it is
necessary that pretending to say something true be the
speaker's primary intention.
Dummett further observes that when a person
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asserts something, that speaker intends to enter a
special deontic state: viz. she intends that, should it
turn out that what she asserts is untrue, she must
either withdraw her assertion or change the world to
make her assertion true. If a speaker continues to say
that P even when P is clearly untrue, and does nothing
to make it the case that P, then she is not asserting.
This consideration leads Dummett to add yet another
necessary condition: (d) S intends that, if P is not
true, she must either retract her assertion or make it
the case that P.
Putting all of these together, we arrive at the
proposal in (12). After arguing for each necessary
condition, Dummett draws a rather surprising
conclusion. He says that assertion simply should not
be analyzed in terms of intentions. Analyzing
assertion by appeal to intentions leads one to make
some "extremely subtle distinctions". (Dummett 1973:
300) And, "it is doubtful whether the notion of
intention will, by itself, bear the weight of these
distinctions". (Dummett 1973: 300)
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2.1.2 Dummett's Positive View
So much for Dummett's negative remarks about
intention based accounts of assertion. Let us now
consider his positive, convention based, account.
Dummett says,
...assertion consists in the (deliberate)
utterance of a sentence which, by its form
and context, is recognized as being used
according to a certain general convention.
(Dummett 1973: 311)
About imperatives, he writes,
...the utterance of a sentence of a certain
form, unless special circumstances divest
this act of its usual significance, in itself
constitutes the giving of a command. (Dummett
1973: 301-302)
Assertion and other speech acts "consist in"
uttering expressions of the right form; uttering the
appropriate kind of expression "in itself constitutes"
the corresponding speech act. This talk of "consisting
in" and "constituting" suggests that, according to
30
Dummett, the uttering of a certain kind of expression
is identical to the performance of the corresponding
speech act. Applied to assertion, the following
identity would hold for every possible utterance x:
(13) {x: x is an act of asserting) = {y: y is an act of
uttering an assertoric sentence)
Notice, however, that Dummett includes an
important hedge to this identity claim. He says that
the context must be right; circumstances must be such
that the saying of the sentence does not lose its
ordinary significance. Dummett introduces this
qualification because speakers sometimes utter
assertoric sentences without making assertions: for
instance, actors practicing their lines do not make
assertions when they produce assertoric sentences.
Dummett therefore restricts the identity to cases in
which conventionally specified conditions obtain. The
result is the following convention based account of
assertion:
(14) Convention Based Analysis of Assertion: A speaker
S makes an assertion that P if and only if:
(a) S utters an assertoric sentence whose sense is P
(b) The conventionally specified conditions C for
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making an assertion obtain
Notice that Dummett's account of assertion is an
instance of a general schema, one often applied to such
conventional acts as doubling in bridge, bringing down
a verdict, or promising. These and similar acts are
thought by some philosophers -- Austin (1962) for
example -- to be identical to the acts of saying
"double", "guilty" and "I promise" respectively --
under conventionally specified circumstances.
The general schema, which supposedly applies to
all such speech acts, is given in (15):
(15) The General Schema: A speaker S performs a speech
act A if and only if:
(a) S utters a linguistic expression of type E
(b) The conventionally specified conditions C for
performing a speech act A obtain
Consider an example. If this general schema does
indeed yield satisfactory analyses of conventional
actions, one could give an analysis of bidding in
bridge by stating:
(a) The linguistic expressions E used to make bids
32
(b) The conditions C, specified in the rules of bridge,
under which each different bid can be made
An extremely simplified and incomplete
specification of E and C for bidding in bridge might
run as follows: E is the class of noun phrases
consisting of a numeral from one to six, followed by
one of "clubs", "diamonds", "hearts" or "spades"; C
includes, among many other conditions, that it must be
the bidder's turn; that her bid must exceed all
previous bids; that the last suit bid becomes trump;
and, that the last couple to bid must take the number
of tricks bid, plus six.
Dummett's great insight was to assimilate
assertion to more clearly conventional speech acts,
like bidding in bridge; conventional actions which, it
may be thought, are fairly well understood. Evidently,
this assimilation makes Dummett's analysis rather less
radical and, we think, rather more plausible than it
would otherwise be.
Dummett achieves the assimilation by specifying
(what he takes to be) the appropriate substitutions for
the schematic letters in the general schema. What are
the appropriate substitutions, according to Dummett?
33
Well, obviously enough, "makes an assertion that P"
should be substituted for the schematic expression
performs a speech act A.
As for the schematic letter C, Dummett does not
say what should be substituted for it: he never
enumerates the conventionally specified conditions for
performing an assertion. (Presumably, Dummett
considers the correct substitution for C a mere detail,
that may be attended to later.)
Whatever one substitutes for C, however, the
substitution which Dummett proposes for a linguistic
expression of type E is too restrictive. This
schematic expression should, according to Dummett, be
replaced by "an assertoric sentence whose sense is P".
About this, he is surely mistaken -- assuming the
Thesis is correct. The argument runs as follows:
Premise 1: If a speaker S makes an assertion if and
only if S utters an assertoric sentence and the
conventionally specified conditions C for making an
assertion obtain then the class of assertings is co-
extensional with the class of assertoric sentence
utterings under conventionally specified conditions
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Premise 2: The class of assertings is not co-
extensional with the class of assertoric sentence
utterings under conventionally specified conditions
Therefore,
Conclusion: It in not the case that a speaker S makes
an assertion if and only if S utters an assertoric
sentence and the conventionally specified conditions C
for making an assertion obtain
Premise 2 -- which does all the work here --
derives from the Thesis. If the Thesis is correct,
speakers can make assertions by uttering words or
phrases in isolation. Such utterances belong in the
class of assertings. But assertoric utterings of words
and phrases do not belong in the class of utterings of
assertoric sentences, because words and phrases are not
assertoric sentences: words and phrases neither express
thoughts nor have assertoric force. A forteriori,
assertoric utterings of words and phrases are not
utterings of assertoric sentences under conventionally
specified conditions. (This restricted class is
contained in the class of utterings of assertoric
sentences; hence it cannot contain anything which the
class of utterings of assertoric sentences does not
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contain.) In a word: Dummett's proposal is too
restrictive.
The natural and obvious reaction to this objection
is to appeal to the ellipsis hypothesis. It is
tempting to suppose that when a speaker makes an
assertion by uttering an (apparent) word or phrase in
isolation, what that speaker really produces is some
elliptical sentence; as Dummett might have it, an
elliptical assertoric sentence.
In fact, Dummett considers a case in which someone
says "The highest mountain in the world" in isolation.
(Dummett 1973: 297-298) He concedes that, given an
appropriate context, one can utter these words and
thereby make an assertion. But, Dummett says, what the
speaker really produces in such cases is "an
abbreviated form of utterance of a sentence". (Dummett
1973: 298)
If this were true, Dummett's analysis would
straightforwardly apply: a speaker makes an assertion
if and only if he produces an assertoric sentence
(abbreviated or otherwise) under conventionally
specified conditions. The class of assertions would
remain co-extensional with the class of utterings of
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assertoric sentences under conventionally specified
conditions, because the latter would include utterings
of abbreviated assertoric sentences.
Given the pivotal role which the notion of
assertion plays in Dummett's philosophy, it is crucial
to discover whether the ellipsis hypothesis is true.
If the ellipsis hypothesis is correct, Dummett's
specific claim can be easily salvaged; if, on the other
hand, the Thesis is true, then Dummett's specific claim
is false.
2.1.3 Afterthoughts and Clarifications
In fairness to Dummett, we should note several
important points.
First: the interpretation we have presented of
Dummett (1973) is not, we think, implausible. Indeed,
Donald Davidson (1979) reads Frege: Philosophy of
Language in roughly the same way. He attributes to
Dummett (1973) the view that, "an assertion is an
indicative uttered under conditions specified by
convention..." (Davidson 1979: 111) Nevertheless, we
are not completely confident that the specific analysis
of assertion that we have just presented is the one
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endorsed in Frege: Philosophy of Languaae. Dummett's
remarks there are sometimes equivocal.
Second: we have not argued against every possible
variant of Dummett's specific claim. We suspect that
Dummett cannot rework his view to accommodate the
assertoric use of words and phrases; but we have not
here given any arguments to that effect. Our purpose,
it will be recalled, was to establish the
incompatibility of the Thesis with Dummett's specific
claim as it stands.
Finally: the specific account of assertion
discussed above seems to have been abandoned in
Dummett's recent work. (See, for example, Dummett
(1979, 1991).) Dummett now appears to concede that no
analysis of assertion can be given; in fact, he now
seems rather pessimistic about "Whether or not there is
a non-circular account of what it is to assert..."
(Dummett 1979: 140) It may well be, then, that Dummett
has forsaken his project -- launched in Frege:
Philosophy of Language -- of giving a convention based
analysis of assertion.s
s If Dummett has indeed abandoned this enterprise, he has
made a step in the right direction. For, as will become clear in
what follows, assertion should be analyzed, at least in part, as
an exterior manifestation of intentions. But if Dummett has
abandoned his project, and now takes assertion as a primitive, he
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2.2 Evans on Assertion
Gareth Evans, in his remarkable Varieties of
Reference, argues against an intention based analysis
of assertion -- an analysis which he attributes to
Russell. According to Evans,
[Russell] was accustomed to go straight from
remarks about 'the thought in the mind of the man
who utters a certain sentence'6 to remarks about
the nature of the statement he was making, the
proposition he was putting forward, and so on.
(Evans 1982: 67)
Russell was willing to glide back and forth
between the thought which a speaker intends to express,
and the statement that he makes, because he purportedly
endorsed something like the following analysis of
assertion:
may be left with a nagging problem. As we said at the beginning
of this section, Dummett may well need an adequate analysis of
assertion if his larger philosophical projects are to succeed.
For example: if assertion is taken as a primitive, the reasons
for analyzing truth as correct assertion become rather unclear.
Surely, rather than take assertion as primitive, we might better
take truth as a primitive -- and expunge all mention of
assertion. The concession that no analysis of assertion can be
forthcoming appears, therefore, to be problematic for Dummett.
6 Evans is here quoting Russell (1912: 54).
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(16) Russell's Analysis of Assertion: A speaker S
asserts that P if and only if S utters certain words
with the intention of expressing the thought that P.
Regardless of whether Russell ever subscribed to
this analysis, there can be little doubt that -- as
Evans points out -- having such intentions is not
sufficient for asserting.7
2.2.1 Evans on Russell
Evans notes that someone could utter certain words
with the intention of expressing the thought that P,
but nevertheless fail to assert that P. This occurs,
for example, when the words which a speaker uses do
not, in the circumstances of use, express the thought
which the speaker intends to express. What is said --
i.e. the thought asserted -- in such cases is
determined by the meaning of the words which the
speaker utters, not by the speaker's intentions. Or so
Evans maintains.
7 Evans tends to use "says that", or "states that" as
opposed to "asserts that". The context makes clear, however,
that he uses "say" and "state" in the same way that we use
"assert". Also: Evans (1982) argues that the implication in (16)
does not hold in either direction. For our purposes, however,
the crucial claim is that intending to express P is not
sufficient for asserting P.
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Consider an example. Suppose S intends to express
the thought that John is dead. Suppose further that S
"selects words unsuitable to his thoughts" (Evans 1982:
68); that is, suppose that the words which S selects do
not, in these circumstances, express the thought that
John is dead. Imagine, for example, that S utters the
sentence (17), while intending to express the thought
that John is dead.
(17) Phil is dead
Let us agree that, in the context, sentence (17)
expresses the thought that Phil is dead, not the
thought that John is dead. Hence, says Evans,
regardless of S's intentions, what S asserts is that
Phil is dead. Here we have an example in which saying
certain words with the intention of expressing the
thought that P is not a sufficient condition for
asserting that P.8
8 Evans would admit, we gather, that a speaker could
communicate that John is dead by saying a sentence which means,
in the circumstances, that Phil is dead. But, if Evans is right,
one cannot assert that John is dead by uttering such a sentence.
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2.2.2 Evans' Alternative
According to Evans, the problem with Russell's
analysis is that it ignores an important fact: the fact
that what a speaker asserts depends essentially upon
the meaning (in the circumstances of use) of the words
which that speaker utters. To assert that P, according
to Evans, a speaker must use an expression which is
"suitable" for expressing P. (See Evans 1982: 68)
Evans is surely right about this.
Evans errs, however, in his specification of what
makes an expression "suitable" for expressing P -- if
the Thesis is true. On Evans' view:
For a person to say that P, it is at least
required that the thought that P is one of the
things which the words he utters may, in the
circumstances of use, be conventionally used to
express. (Evans 1982: 67)
We may paraphrase Evans' view as follows:
(18) Evans' Principle: An expression E is suitable for
asserting that P only if, in the circumstances of use,
E expresses the thought that P.
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However initially intuitive Evans' principle may
be, it is prima facie incompatible with the Thesis.
For if Evans' principle were correct, to say or assert
that P it would be necessary to use a linguistic
expression that expresses P in the circumstances of
use. This entails, by existential generalization, that
to say or assert that P one must use a linguistic
expression that expresses some proposition or other in
the circumstances of use.
But notice: one can say -- that is, one can assert
-- propositions by using words and phrases in
isolation. And what a word or phrase expresses in
isolation in C should be precisely what it expresses
within sentences in C. But, for any circumstances C,
what words and phrases within sentences express is non-
propositional. (Words and phrases within sentences, we
will see in Chapter Two, express individual concepts,
properties and generalized quantifiers.) Hence words
and phrases in isolation do not express propositions --
again, no matter what the context. Yet they can be
used in isolation to assert. This refutes Evans'
principle.
Let us illustrate with an example. Suppose Mary
and Alex have made a bet about what John will wear to a
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party. Mary bets that John will wear a blue shirt;
Alex maintains that he will wear a red shirt. John
arrives at the party, Alex sees him, and says the word
"red". In these circumstances, Alex asserts that
John's shirt is red by saying the word "red". But the
thought that John's shirt is red is not one of the
thoughts which the word "red" expresses in these
circumstances. The word "red" in these circumstances
expresses a property, not a proposition: the same
property that an occurrence of "red" within a sentence
would express in these circumstances. (That is to say,
the property red.)
To sum up: Evans has taken an important step in
the right direction by (a) showing that to say certain
words while intending to express the thought that P is
not sufficient for asserting that P; and by (b)
highlighting the fact that, to assert that P, a speaker
must use an expression which is "suitable" for
asserting P. However, Evans' principle regarding which
sorts of expressions are "suitable" is inadequate -- if
the Thesis is correct. For, according to Evans'
principle, only expressions which express propositions
are suitable for making assertions. This excludes
ordinary words and phrases -- because words and phrases
do not express propositions. But, if the Thesis is
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correct, words and phrases can be used to make
assertions.
2.3 Frege's Context Principle
Frege's so-called context principle -- proposed in
Frege (1978) -- can be paraphrased as follows:
(19) The Context Principle: "It is only in the context
of a sentence that a word has a meaning". (Dummett
1981: 360)
This sentence can be understood as expressing at least
four different doctrines. It is not obvious which, if
any, was intended by Frege. What is clear is that two
of them are prima facie incompatible with the following
Corollary to the Thesis.
(20) The Corollary: Words and phrases have a meaning in
isolation.
2.3.1 The Corollary
As we shall see in Chapter Five, an utterance u is
an assertion that P only if either (a) P is the
explicit content of u or (b) P results from combining
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the explicit content of u with some "missing element"
which is salient in the context. (This is a rough
formulation, but it will do for our present purposes.)
A forteriori, u is an assertion only if u has at least
some explicit content.
Now: if the Thesis is true then there are
(possible) utterances of words and phrases in isolation
which are assertions. Hence there must be (possible)
utterances of words and phrases in isolation which have
at least some explicit content. But an utterance of a
meaningless expression could not have explicit content.
Hence if utterances of words and phrases in isolation
can have explicit content then the expressions uttered
-- i.e. the words and phrases in isolation -- must be
contentful.
In a word: the Corollary follows from the Thesis,
together with certain very reasonable views about
assertoric utterances (e.g. the view that assertoric
utterances must have at least some explicit content).
Notice too: hearers can assign a meaning to
utterances of words and phrases in isolation. The
assignment of meaning to these utterances is possible
because, (a) hearers can recognize the word or phrase
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tokened and (b) hearers know the meaning of the word or
phrase as it appears in isolation. If this is right,
then hearers know the meaning of ordinary words and
phrases when they appears in isolation. But, for any
expression E, if anyone knows the meaning of E when it
appears in isolation, then E has a meaning in
isolation. Therefore, words and phrases have a meaning
in isolation.
It is worth stressing the central difference
between the Thesis and its Corollary. The Thesis says
that words and phrases can be used to make assertions
in isolation; the Corollary says that words and phrases
are meaningful in isolation. Dummett's account of
assertion and Evans' principle concern the class of
expressions which speakers can use to make assertions.
Their views conflict with the Thesis because those
views imply that words and phrases cannot be so used.
Frege's context principle concerns the class of
linguistic expressions which are meaningful in
isolation. It is therefore in conflict with the
Corollary because it entails that words and phrases are
not meaningful in isolation.
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2.3.2 Three Construals of The Context Principle
In what follows, we will attempt to disentangle
four interpretations of Frege's context principle.
Afterwards, we will explain why two of them are
incompatible with the Corollary to the Thesis.
Three interpretations of the context principle
arise because the word "sentence" is at least three
ways ambiguous. The word "sentence" may be defined by
appealing to standard use, to meaning or to syntactic
form.
(21) Syntactic Definition: A sentence is any formative
which has a subject and inflected verb.9
(22) Semantic Definition: A sentence is any formative
which is capable of expressing a proposition, in some
context. 10
9 On current views, a sentence is an instance of the X-bar
schema which is headed by an inflectional element. See Chapter
Two for discussion. For the moment, we merely wish to stress
that the syntactic definition of "sentence" refers to formal
features, and not to usage or meaning.
10 We make the simplifying assumption that interrogatives
and imperatives express propositions. By this we mean only that
such sentences either succeed or fail to correspond to the facts
-- in some sense of "corresponding to the facts" that will not be
explained here.
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(23) Pragmatic Definition: A sentence is any formative
which can be used to make a move in a language game.
Let us introduce some terminology. Any formative
which meets the syntactic definition of "sentence" will
be called a SYNTACTIC SENTENCE. Any formative which
satisfies the semantic definition will be labelled a
SEMANTIC SENTENCE. Finally, any formative which meets
the pragmatic definition will be termed a PRAGMATIC
SENTENCE.
It is standardly assumed that the class of
pragmatic sentences is extensionally equivalent to the
class of semantic sentences, which in turn is
extensionally equivalent to the class of syntactic
sentences. If the Thesis is correct, however, none of
these equivalences hold.
If the Thesis is correct, speakers can use
ordinary words and phrases to make assertions. But
ordinary words and phrases are not syntactic sentences.
So: the set of pragmatic sentences is not identical to
the set of syntactic sentences because the former, but
not the latter, includes words and phrases.
Furthermore, ordinary words and phrases do not
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express propositions, even given a context. Hence they
are not semantic sentences. But, if the Thesis is
true, words and phrases are pragmatic sentences.
Therefore, if the Thesis is correct, the class of
pragmatic sentences is not identical to the class of
semantic sentences: again, because the former, but not
the latter, includes words and phrases.
In short, if the Thesis is true, the following
equivalences do not hold:
(24) {x: x is a syntactic sentence) = {y: y is a
pragmatic sentence}
(25) {x: x is a semantic sentence) = {y: y is a
pragmatic sentence}
Nor is it clear that,
(26) {x: is a syntactic sentence) = {y: y is a semantic
sentence}
There are some expressions which are not prima facie
syntactic sentences, 11 but which nevertheless are
" We say "prima facie" because it might be that (what we
call) Predicative Phrases are actually Inflectional Phrases with
phonologically null inflectional elements. Alternatively, the
correct definition of "sentence" might not equate sentences with
Inflectional Phrases, and hence might include Predicative
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capable of expressing propositions in context. Here
are some examples:
(27)
(a) You no good lying bastard (McCawley 1988: 764)
(b) Good idea that
(c) A good talker your friend Steve
It seems to us that these formatives -- which we label
PREDICATIVE PHRASES -- express predications. They are
divided into subject and predicate in roughly the
following way:
(28)
(a) [suB You] [PRED no good lying bastard]
(b) [PRED Good idea] [suB that]
(c) [PRED A good talker] [suB your friend Steve]
Because they have both a subject and a predicate,
Predicative Phrases are capable of expressing
propositions. Yet they exhibit no overt inflectional
element. Hence, at least at first glance, Predicative
Phrases are not sentences in the syntactic sense,
though they are capable of expressing propositions.
Phrases. We will not explore these possibilities here.
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This is not merely to say that Predicative Phrases
can be used to assert propositions; for, if the Thesis
is correct, ordinary words and phrases can be so used
as well. Rather, we wish to claim that the semantic
value of these expressions is fully propositional -- in
context, of course.
Given these three senses of "sentence", we can now
state three different interpretations of Frege's
context principle. Whatever the truth of the three
following principles, it is surely worth distinguishing
them.
(29) The Syntactic Construal: It is only in the context
of an expression that has a subject and inflected verb
that a word has a meaning.
(30) The Semantic Construal: It is only in the context
of a formative capable of expressing a proposition that
a word has a meaning.
(31) The Pragmatic Construal: It is only in the context
of a formative which can be used in isolation to make
moves in a language game that a word has meaning.
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2.3.3 The Fourth Construal: Dummett on Frege
The fourth and final reading of the context
principle is presented in Dummett (1973: 192-196) and
Dummett (1981: 360ff). Let us therefore call it
"Dummett's construal".
Dummett (1981: 369) writes,
As a principle concerning sense, the context
principle singles out sentences as having a
unique role in any account of the senses of
expressions. The sense of any expression is
its contribution to determining the condition
for the truth of any sentence in which it
occurs.
In short,
(32) Dummett's Construal: "the true account of the
sense of a word is in terms of its contribution to the
senses of sentences containing it..." (Dummett 1981:
373)
On this interpretation of Frege's context
principle, sentences have a certain primacy over other
linguistic formatives since, to give the meaning of any
non-sentential formative, we must make reference to the
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sentences in which it occurs.12
Dummett's construal of the context principle can
be illustrated with the following example. On
Dummett's construal, to give the meaning of the phrase
"is blond" we must appeal to the contribution of this
phrase to sentences in which the phrase "is blond"
occurs. A partial account of the meaning of "is
blond", for example, would be the following: the phrase
"is blond" combines with the name "John" to yield the
sentence "John is blond", whose sense is the thought
that John is blond.13 Notice: reference to a sentence,
and to the thought which it expresses, is essential.
Regardless of which of these interpretations of
the context principle Frege intended, Dummett (1981)
has convincingly argued that all Frege needed for his
purposes is this fourth construal. As Dummett rightly
points out, part of Frege's project in the Foundations
of Arithmetic was to answer the question, "What are the
12 Dummett gives another paraphrase which seems to us rather
different. He writes that, "we cannot give an account of the
sense of a word taken in isolation..." (Dummett 1981: 373) In
this passage, Dummett appears to make the stronger claim that we
cannot state the meaning of a word in isolation, even by
referring to the contribution of that word to sentences. This is
presumably because, taken in isolation, words have no meaning.
This claim surely is incompatible with the Corollary to the
Thesis.
13 For further related discussion, see Dummett (1989: 304).
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natural numbers?"
If we take this as a linguistic inquiry -- e.g. a
question about the meaning of expressions like "The
number one", "The number two", etc. -- then we are not
immediately tempted to identify numbers with some idea
or mental image. (This being, of course, the kind of
answer which Frege (1978) wanted to discourage.) But,
says Dummett, even understood as an inquiry about
phrases like "The number one", taken in isolation, the
inappropriate answer may still be forthcoming.
It might be said, for example, that the number one
is some mental image which we associate with the phrase
"the number one". As Dummett explairs,
If we commit the mistake of doing what Frege
calls 'asking after the reference of the word
in isolation', that is, of asking what it
stands for in neglect of the fact that the
answer can only be, and need only be,
whatever is required to give, in combination
with rules governing other words, a correct
means of determining the truth values of
sentences containing the word, then, in
problematic cases, we are likely to come up
with an entirely inappropriate answer, such
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as the image which the utterance of the word
has the propensity to call up in our minds.
(Dummett 1973: 195)
Armed with Dummett's construal of the context
principle, however, the tendency to think of numbers as
mental images is wholly overcome. We are to ask what
phrases like "The number one" contribute to the sense
of sentences in which they occur. This task obviously
involves only the meaning of certain linguistic items -
- the meaning which they contribute to sentences. It
does not invite mention of ideas, mental images, or any
other psychological creatures.
2.3.4 Two Construals Are Incompatible With The
Corollary
Dummett's construal of the context principle is
not, so far as we can see, in conflict with the Thesis
or the Corollary. And the pragmatic construal -- the
idea that words are meaningful only in the context of
7ormatives that can be used to make moves in a language
game -- also appears to be compatible with both.
But the other two construals are incompatible with
the Corollary. The principle that words have meaning
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only in the context of expressions that have subjects
and inflected verbs (i.e. the syntactic construal) is
false -- and on empirical grounds -- if ordinary words
and phrases are meaningful in isolation.14
It is also incorrect to say that words have
meaning only within semantic sentences, again because
words and phrases -- which are not semantic sentences -
- are meaningful in isolation.
In sum: paying attention to the use of words and
phrases in isolation, we discover that there are at
least four ways of interpreting Frege's context
principle. On two of these interpretations (i.e. the
syntactic and semantic construal), the context
principle is inconsistent with the Corollary to the
Thesis.
2.4 Russell on Descriptions
14 In fact, the syntactic construal of the context principle
may well be falsified on independent grounds. If the correct
syntactic characterization of the notion "sentence" is the one we
give in Chapter Two (i.e. a sentence is the maximal projection of
an inflectional element), then there is another non-sentential
construction within which words are meaningful, namely
Predicative Phrases. Prima facie anyway, Predicative Phrases are
not syntactic sentences because they do not have inflected verbs.
Yet it is surely true that words are meaningful in the context of
Predicative Phrases.
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Bertrand Russell, in Introduction to Mathematical
Philosophy, presents his celebrated theory of
descriptions. That theory, when combined with the
principle of significance -- which Russell also
espoused -- is incompatible with the Corollary to the
Thesis.
(33) Russell's Principle of Significance: If a symbol
or group of symbols is not a constituent in some
proposition, then it has no significance.
In what follows, we will introduce Russell's
theory of descriptions and consider his motivations for
embracing it. We will then show that this theory, when
combined with the principle of significance, is in
conflict with the Corollary. Hence if the Corollary is
true, Russell is mistaken about either the theory of
descriptions, or the principle of sigilificance, or
both.
2.4.1 Sentences and Propositions
Before proceeding, however, a few remarks are in
order about sentences and propositions. Russell, at
least in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy,
purposely blurs the distinction between (what we would
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call) propositions on the one hand and symbols that
express propositions on the other. At this stage of
his writing, propositions are "a form of words which
expresses what is either true or false". (Russell 1919:
155. Our emphasis.) He writes,
I think the word "proposition" should be limited
to what may, in some sense, be called "symbols",
and further to such symbols as give expression to
truth and falsehood. Thus "two and two are four"
and "two and two are five" will be propositions,
and so will "Socrates is a man" and "Socrates is
not a man". (Russell 1919: 155)
(Notice that even the examples he gives are what we
would call quoted sentences.) In what follows, we have
tried to be faithful to Russeli's terminology, even
though we ourselves distinguish symbols from the things
they express.
2.4.2 The Theory of Descriptions
The central tenet of Russell's theory of
descriptions is that descriptions, both definite and
indefinite, are not logical subjects. That is:
according to Russell, the surface grammar of natural
languages (like English) is misleading as to the
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logical form of sentences containing descriptions.
Sentences containing descriptions look rather like
subject-predicate sentences, where the description
occupies the place of the subject. But appearances are
misleading.
Consider an example. The description "'The Queen
of England" looks like the subject of sentence (34).
And, indeed, it is the surface subject.
(34) The Queen of England just arrived
But, on Russell's view, sentence (34) does not have a
logical subject at all. Lemmon puts the point nicely:
"When submitted to a proper logical analysis, [sentence
(34)] turns out to be... a complex existential claim;
the subject-predicate facade disappears". (Lemmon 1966:
234) According to Russell, the true logical form of
(34) is displayed by the sentence in (35). (Roughly
speaking, what (35) says is: there is exactly one Queen
of England and she just arrived.)
(35)
(a) "x is Queen of England" is not always false
(b) "if x and y are Queens of England, x and y are
identical" is always true
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(c) "if x is Queen of England, x just arrived" is
always true15
Russell's idea, in a nutshell, was that
propositions containing descriptions have a logical
form similar to "Some A are B", "All A are B", and so
on. Importantly: in Russell's logical notation, no
single part of these existential and universal
propositions corresponds to the English quantified noun
phrase. Their logical forms are given below:
(36) "x is A and x is B" is sometimes true
(37) "If x is A then x is B" is always true
The same holds, according to Russell, for sentences
containing descriptions. The proposition "The Queen of
England just arrived", for example, contains no
constituent corresponding to the words "The Queen of
England".
15 See Russell (1919: 177). By "always", Russell means in
all cases. No suggestion of time is intended.
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2.4.3 Russell's Principle of Significance
The theory of descriptions, on its own, is
compatible with the Corollary. But Russell further
endorsed the Principle of Significance, introduced at
the outset.
(33) Russell's Principle of Significance: If a symbol
or group of symbols is not a constituent in some
proposition, then it has no significance.
It is because Russell adopts the principle of
significance that he slides easily between an
expression being meaningful and there being some object
corresponding to that expression. For instance,
consider the following passage, in which Russell
suggests that we saddle ourselves with unicorns as soon
as we attribute meaning to the words "a unicorn":
Thus if we falsely attribute meaning to these two
words, we find ourselves saddled with "a unicorn",
and with the problem of how there can be such a
thing in a world where there are no unicorns.
(Russell 1919: 170)
He further says:
... in dealing with propositions, we are dealing
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in the first instance with symbols, and if we
attribute significance to groups of symbols which
have no significance, we shall fall into the error
of admitting unrealities, in the only sense in
which this is possible, namely, as objects
described. (Russell 1919: 170)
The principle of significance, when combined with
the theory of descriptions, yields the conclusion that
descriptions are not meaningful units. The principle
of significance states that a unit is meaningful only
if it forms a constituent in propositions; and,
according to the theory of descriptions, descriptions
do not form constituents in propositions. The
conclusion, as Russell states it, is as follows: a
description, whether definite or indefinite, is not "a
subordinate group having a meaning of its own".
(Russell 1919: 170) He gives "I met a unicorn" as an
example:
In the proposition "I met a unicorn", the whole
four words together make a significant
proposition, and the word "unicorn" by itself is
significant, in just the same way as the word
"man". But the two words "a unicorn" do not form
a subordinate group having a meaning of its own.
(Russell 1919: 170)
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Further along, Russell discusses definite
descriptions. About "the so-and-so" he says:
One very important point about the definition of
"a so-and-so" applies equally to "the so-and-so";
the definition [of "the so-and-so"] to be sought
is a definition of propositions in which this
phrase occurs, not a definition of the phrase
itself in isolation. (Russell 1919: 172)
We should not, according to Russell, seek a definition
of the phrase in isolation precisely because none is to
be found. The phrase (in isolation) simply has no
definition -- no significance.16
We believe that Russell is simply mistaken about
the meaningfulness of descriptions. Descriptions,
definite and indefinite, do have meanings in isolation.
This is shown by the fact that some (possible)
utterances of descriptions in isolation are assertoric.
To review the argument: all assertoric utterances --
including assertoric utterances of descriptions in
isolation -- have explicit content; but an utterance of
a meaningless expression would not have explicit
16 Similar views are expressed in Russell (1905: 208). He
writes: "According to the view which I advocate, a denoting
phrase is essentially part of a sentence, and does not, like most
single words, have any significance on its own".
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content. Hence all assertoric utterances of
descriptions in isolation must be utterancea of
meaningful expressions.
Notice too: hearers can understand utterances of
descriptions in isolation. Hearers are able to do this
because they recognize the description used, and they
know its meaning. But if hearers know the meaning of
descriptions then descriptions must have a meaning.
Consider an example. Someone could assert that a
man from Spain was at a party by uttering the
indefinite description in (38)
(38) A man from Spain
Or, a speaker could equally well assert that some
anticipated man from Spain had arrived by saying the
definite description (39).
(39) The man from Spain
Upon hearing these descriptions in isolation, an
interpreter would apply his knowledge of the meaning of
the descriptions in question, and would infer the
speaker's meaning. (See Chapter Five for a detailed
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discussion.) But if the interpreter knows the meaning
of these descriptions, then they must have a meaning.
If Russell's view is to be consistent with the
Thesis and its Corollary, he must reject either the
theory of descriptions or the principle of
significance. Neither horn of this dilemma is
attractive.
2.4.4 Russell on Ontological Commitment
Part of Russell's stated motivation for adopting
the theory of descriptions is ontological. In
deference to "a robust sense of reality", Russell
insists on banishing so-called "non-existent" objects.
We are not to countenance unicorns, sea-monsters or
other phantasms:
In obedience to the feeling of reality, we shall
insist that, in the analysis of propositions,
nothing "unreal" is to be admitted. (Russell 1919:
170)
Nor should we posit "indefinite objects" such as
the object corresponding to "a man" -- not any
particular man, mind you, but the indefinite man.
(Russell 1919: 173) Russell writes:
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... when we have enumerated all the men in the
world, there is nothing left of which we can say,
"This is a man, and not only so, but it is the 'a
man', the quintessential entity that is just an
indefinite man without being anybody in
particular." It is of course quite clear that
whatever there is in the world is definite: if it
is a man it is one definite man and not any other.
Thus there cannot be such an entity as "a man" to
be found in the world, as opposed to specific men.
And accordingly it is natural that we do not
define "a man" itself, but only the propositions
in which it occurs.
Russell is surely right to reject "unreal" and
"indefinite" objects. But it is worth asking why
Russell thought there was an ontological problem at
all. The reason, apparently, is that he believed that
if descriptions like "the round square", "a unicorn"
and "a man" were constituents of significant
propositions, then our ontology would immediately be
burdened with such "unreal" and "indefinite" objects.
In a word, Russell held something like the following
Principle of Ontological Commitment:
(40) Russell's Principle of Ontological Commitment: If
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there exists a significant proposition containing a
constituent "a" then there is an object or
propositional function corresponding to "a".
Let us consider an example, to illustrate how the
principle of ontological commitment can lead to a
bloated ontology. Russell (1919: 168) concedes that
the proposition "I met a unicorn" is significant,
though false. Now let us suppose that "a unicorn" is a
constituent in this proposition. Then there exists at
least one significant proposition containing "a
unicorn" as a constituent. It follows, from the
principle of ontological commitment, that there is an
object corresponding to "a unicorn". So our ontology
must include this object.
Russell avoids ontological commitment to unicorns,
the indefinite man, round squares and such by
introducing the theory of descriptions. This theory
has the advantage that descriptions -- including "a
unicorn", "a man", "the present King of France" and so
on -- simply are not constituents of propositions. As
Russell puts it,
The important point is that, when rightly
analyzed, propositions verbally about "a so-and-
so" are found to contain no constituent
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represented by this phrase. (Russell 1919: 171)
Hence sentences containing descriptions do not carry
ontological commitment to the thing described. If
Russell abandons the theory of descriptions, however,
he must find another means of unburdening his ontology
-- unless he rejects the principle of ontological
commitment altogether.
Alternatively, Russell could give up the principle
of significance, and allow that descriptions are
meaningful even though they are not constituents in
propositions. But the principle of significance is at
the very heart of Russell's theory of meaning. The
meaning of an expression, for the Russell of this
period, just is the constituent (object or
propositional function) which the expression refers to.
In sum: if the Corollary is true, then Russell
faces a dilemma. He can maintain the principle of
significance, but then he must abandon the theory of
descriptions. And, if he does this, then he no longer
has a solution to the ontological embroglio.
Alternatively, Russell can maintain his theory of
descriptions, and the solution it provides to the
ontological problem of "non-existent" and "indefinite"
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objects. But then he must give up the principle of
significance. But as goes the principle of
significance, so goes Russell's theory of meaning.
Neither option is attractive.
Of course Russell can maintain both the principle
of significance and the theory of descriptions, should
it turn out that the Corollary, as applied to
descriptions, is false. But, as we will shortly argue,
the Corollary is true, even as applied to descriptions.
3 Summary
We began this chapter by stating the Thesis:
(1) The Thesis: Speakers can make assertions by
uttering words and phrases in isolation
We then considered two philosophical doctrines which
appear to be in conflict with this Thesis: Dummett's
specific account of assertion and Evans' principle.
We then introduced a Corollary to the Thesis:
(20) The Corollary: Words and phrases have a meaning in
isolation.
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We pointed out that Frege's context principle, on
at least two interpretations of it, is prima facie
incompatible with the Corollary. As is Russell's
theory of descriptions -- when conjoined with his
principle of significance.
We have not argued that if the Thesis and its
Corollary are true, then every variant of these
doctrines is false. We make the weaker claim that if
the Thesis and its Corollary are true, the
philosophical doctrines as they stand face objections
from the assertoric use of words and phrases in
isolation. Whether they can be repaired so as to meet
these objections remains an open question. But it now
becomes rather important to establish whether the
Thesis and its Corollary are true. The remainder of
this dissertation will address this question.
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CHAPTER TWO: SOME BACKGROUND17
In this chapter we present material which we take
for granted in the remainder of the thesis. First, we
review some central ideas about the syntax and
semantics of words, phrases and sentences. It will
then be clear what we mean by saying that it is not
just sentences, but also words and phrases which are
used assertorically in isolation: by this, we mean that
expressions having the syntactic structure and semantic
content of words and phrases are used in isolation to
make assertions.
Next, we introduce some of the key notions of
relevance theory, an approach to language and
communication presented in Sperber and Wilson (1986,
1987).
17 We would like to here express our thanks to Chris
Collins, a friend and colleague, for his very helpful tutorials
in syntax. We should also make clear that, in our discussion of
syntax -- in this chapter and elsewhere in the dissertation --
wherever simplification does not affect the soundness of our
arguments, we omit details.
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1 The Syntax and Semantics of Phrases
1.1 The X-bar Schema
We assume that the notion "word" is clear enough
for our purposes. But what are phrases? X-bar theory,
described in Jackendoff (1977), Chomsky (1981),
Haegeman (1991) and references cited there, provides a
very general answer to this question. According to X-
bar theory, every phrase has the following form, called
the X-BAR SCHEMA:
(41) XP
Specifier of X X'
X Complement of X
By substituting a LEXICAL CATEGORY VARIABLE for X, a
phrasal category results. A list of lexical category
variables is given below:
(42) Lexical Category Variables = {Noun, Verb,
Preposition, Adjective, Adverb}
The X-bar schema captures the fact that every
phrase of category X is headed by an element of type X.
Noun Phrases have nouns as heads; Verb Phrases have
verbs as heads; and so on. Substituting a lexical
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category variable for X in the X-bar schema yields the
general form of phrases of that category.
For example, we may substitute N for X. The
result is the general form shared by all Noun Phrases.
(Elsewhere in the grammar, it is stated that the
specifier of N is DET, and that one possible complement
of N is PP.)
(43) NP
DET N'
N PP
Filling in particular words under DET, N and PP we
produce a specific Noun Phrase. For instance, taking
[the] as the determiner, [man] as the noun and [from
Brazil] as the prepositional phrase, the result is:
(44) NP
DET N'
l, / \
the N PP
I I
I I
man from Brazil
Importantly, there are two types of category
variables. On the one hand, there are the lexical
categories, which we have just reviewed. These include
Noun, Verb, Preposition, Adjective and Adverb. Lexical
categories dominate open classes of words; classes to
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which new members can be freely added. On the other
hand, there are NON-LEXICAL categories. Of particular
interest to us is the category INFL.
INFL dominates the inflectional morphology of the
verb (i.e. subject-verb agreement), tense markers and
the infinitival marker "to". In English, INFL also
dominates a closed class of words, consisting of the
aspectual auxiliaries ("have" and "be") and the modals
("will", "can", "may", "shall", "must").18
By substituting INFL for X in the X-bar schema we
arrive at (45), the general form that is shared by all
sentences. (Again: elsewhere in the grammar it is
stated that the specifier of I is NP, and that the
complement of I is CP or VP.)
(45) IP
NP I'
I CP/VP
By filling in particular formatives under NP, I
and CP/VP we produce a specific sentence (i.e. an
Inflectional Phrase). For instance, taking [p The
18 In many languages, aspect and modality are indicated by
inflectional morphology. In these languages, INFL does not
dominate any words.
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Queen of England] as the Noun Phrase, [INFL
present/singular] as INFL and [v, be [pp in France]] as
the Verb Phrase, the result is:
(46) IP
NP I'
The Queen I VP
of England / \
pres V PP
sing
be in France
Any instance of the X-bar schema which is headed
by INFL is a sentence.19 A phrase, on the other hand,
is any instance of the X-bar schema which is headed by
a lexical category. This will serve as our syntactic
characterization of the class of phrases.
1.2 The Semantics of Phrases
Following Lewis (1970), Dowty, Wall and Peters
(1981), Bach (1989) and Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet
(1990) among many others, we divide words and phrases
semantically into three basic SEMANTIC TYPES. These
are:
19 Complementizer Phrases are also projected from non-
lexical heads, i.e. COMP. For our purposes, however, we can
ignore this complication.
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(47) Semantic type one: formatives that express
individual concepts
(48) Semantic type two: formatives that express
properties
(49) Semantic type three: formatives that express
generalized quantifiers, where a generalized quantifier
is a function from properties to propositions.20
Let us consider an example from each of the three
semantic types.
The Noun Phrase "Miss America" is of semantic type
one: it expresses an individual concept. The specific
individual concept it expresses designates the unique
person, if any, who happens to be Miss America. (Which
person that is depends, of course, on how things stand
in the world.)
The word "red" expresses a property. It is,
20 Of course, to give the SEMANTIC VALUE of a word or phrase
we need to state not only its semantic type, but also the
specific individual concept, property or generalized quantifier
expressed. For example: every one-place predicate has the same
semantic type as every other one-place predicate; all of them
express properties. To give the semantic value of a one-place
predicate, therefore, it is not sufficient to give its semantic
type; one must also say precisely which property the predicate
expresses. Similarly for every phrase in the language, whether
of type one, two or three: to give it semantic type is not yet
give its semantic value.
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therefore, of semantic type two. The specific property
it expresses is the property red.
The Noun Phrase "some apples" expresses a
generalized quantifier. It is of semantic type three.
As we have said, generalized quantifiers are functions
from properties to propositions. The particular
generalized quantifier expressed by "some apples" is
that function which takes any property F as argument
and yields as its value the proposition that some
apples have the property F. If the property F is had
by some apple or other, this proposition is true; if
the property F is not had by any apple, then the
resulting proposition is false.
To repeat: semantically speaking, words and
phrases divide into three semantic types: those which
express individual concepts, those which express
properties and those which express generalized
quantifiers. This will serve as our semantic
characterization of words and phrases. The most
important thing to notice about this characterization
is the following: sentences -- including elliptical
sentences -- express none of these three semantic
types. Sentences express propositions; words and
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phrases do not.21
2 Sperber and Wilson
In Chapter Five we show that a typical speaker can
make an assertion by uttering the ordinary phrase (6)
in isolation.
(6) John's father
To establish this conclusion, we make extensive use of
relevance theory. In this section we will therefore
introduce relevance theory as it is presented in
Sperber and Wilson (1986).
2.1 Two Interpretive Processes
According to Sperber and Wilson, utterance
interpretation involves two rather different processes.
On the one hand, the interpreter must recover the
linguistic representation of the utterance. (This they
call the decoding process.) On the other hand, the
hearer must discover the speaker's meaning on the basis
of this linguistic representation. This is the
21 To be more precise: sentences express propositional
characters, functions from contexts to propositions. We abstract
away from this complication throughout.
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inferential process.
2.1.1 The Decoding Process
A complete linguistic representation of an
utterance will give at least three different
descriptions of the utterance: a phonetic description
(the Phonetic Form of the utterance), a syntactic
description (the Syntactic Structure of the utterance)
and a semantic description (the Logical Form of the
utterance).22
For the most part, Sperber and Wilson treat the
recovery of the linguistic representation as a "black
box". The hearer uses a discreet body of linguistic
knowledge to decode the utterance; the linguistic
representation she assigns the utterance then serves as
the departure point for the inferential process.
22 One important note: not all linguistic representations
are equally grammatical; grammaticality comes in degrees. Some
linguistic representations are wholly grammatical, others are
slightly ill-formed, others are wholly ill-formed and still
others are "word salad". Compare, for example, the linguistic
representation of utterances of (i) through (iv). Evidently,
these linguistic representations exhibit different degrees of
ill-formedness.
(i) John adores talking to Mary
(ii) ?John adores Mary to talk to
(iii) *John adore talking Mary
(iv) **Talk adore John Mary to
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2.1.2 The Inferential Process
In what follows, we will ignore implicated
propositions, concentrating instead on asserted
propositions. Hence, for our purposes, we may think of
the inferential process as the means whereby the hearer
goes beyond the utterance's linguistic representation,
to arrive at what its speaker asserted in producing it.
To recover the proposition asserted, the hearer
may need to perform three sub-tasks. Where the
utterance is assigned more than one Logical Form (e.g.
an utterance of "Flying planes can be dangerous"), she
will need to disambiguate; where the TLogical Form of
the utterance contains indexical elements (e.g. an
utterance of "He bought that in Chicago"), she will
need to discover the reference of these indexicals; and
where the Logical Form of the utterance contains some
vague element (e.g. an utterance of "That is big"), she
will need to ENRICH the vague element. (I.e. she will
need to choose between, e.g., big for an insect, big
for a building, big for a star, etc.) Each of these
sub-tasks involves making inferences.
Sperber and Wilson call these three sub-tasks
FILLING IN or COMPLETING the Logical Form provided by
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decoding. Using information available from memory and
from other cognitive systems, a single Logical Form is
selected. The resulting Logical Form is the
PROPOSITIONAL FORM of the utterance.
2.1.3 Illocutionary Force
The propositional form of an utterances expresses
its explicit propositional content. But utterances
have more than propositional content. They also have
illocutionary force. The hearer must determine, for
example, whether the utterance was intended as an
assertion, a question or a command. Here again, both
decoding and inference will play a part.
Decoding contributes a first hypothesis about what
linguistic act is being performed. According to
Sperber and Wilson, the hearer recovers the
propositional form P of the utterance in question, and
embeds it in an assumption schema of the form (50),
where X may be replaced by "assert", "command", "ask",
"implore" and other speech act verbs:
(50) The speaker is X-ing that/whether P
Different linguistic representations -- for
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example, linguistic representations of different
grammatical moods -- are correlated, in the language,
with different instances of this schema. Imperative
sentence, for example, call up the instance of (50)
given below.
(51) The speaker is commanding that P
A hearer, upon encountering an utterance of an
imperative sentence, automatically substitutes the
propositional form of the utterance for P in this
assumption schema.
Upon hearing a declarative sentence, on the other
hand, a hearer automatically substitutes the
propositional form for P in (52):
(52) The speaker is asserting that P
The result of substituting the appropriate speech
act verb for X in (50) and filling in the selected
propositional form for P is the assumption that
provides the hearer's first hypothesis about the force
(and propositional content) of the utterance. But
sometimes this first hypothesis is incorrect.
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Here is an example. Suppose Mary produces an
utterance of sentence (53).
(53) John will be home by ten o'clock
Because (53) is a declarative sentence, the hearer
first embeds its propositional form in the assumption
schema (52), arriving at the first hypothesis: that the
speaker is asserting that John will be home by ten
o'clock.
But the actual illocutionary force of the
utterance may aiffer from this first hypothesis. The
actual illocutionary force of the utterance is
determined by what linguistic act the speaker actually
intends to perform; whether, for example, he intends to
assert, command or inquire. And, to discover the
speaker's actual intentions -- rather than merely
recovering this first hypothesis -- the hearer must
embark on the inferential process, basing her
inferences upon the context and her general knowledge
of the world.
Returning to our example: the inferential process
may result in the rejection of the initial hypothesis -
- i.e. that Mary is asserting that John will be home by
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ten o'clock. For instance, suppose John is Mary's
seven year old son, over whom Mary has custody. And
suppose Mary is addressing her ex-husband, who is
taking John out for the day. Because Mary has custody
over John, while the husband is merely taking him out
for a visit, Mary is in a legal position to make
demands about what time John will arrive home. Knowing
all of this information, John's father -- the hearer in
this case -- should construe the utterance of (53) as a
command, rather than an assertion.
The essential lesson of this example is that the
hearer, in determining the actual force of the
utterance, uses information about marital
relationships, legal custody and so on to make
inferences about what linguistic act Mary intended to
perform. So: finding the actual illocutionary force of
an utterance inevitably involves making inferences.
One important terminological matter, before we sum
up. In what follows, we will have cause to refer to
the illocutionary force of expressions, and not just
the illocutionary force of utterances. (This way of
speaking is not to be found in Sperber and Wilson's
work; but the central ideas are theirs.) The
illocutionary force of an expression is determined by
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the assumption schema which tokens of it automatically
occasion.
We will say that an expression E has ASSERTORIC
FORCE if and only if hearers, upon encountering
utterances of E, automatically embed the utterance's
propositional form in the assumption schema (52). (See
Sperber and Wilson 1986: 246 for discussion).
(52) The speaker is asserting that P
An expression E has IMPERATIVAL FORCE if and only
if, upon first hearing an utterance E, "the hearer, on
recovering the propositional form P of [that utterance
of E] would integrate it into a description of the form
The speaker is telling the hearer to P". (Sperber and
Wilson 1986: 251) Finally, we will say that an
expression E has INTERROGATIVE FORCE if and only if the
hearer automatically "recovers [the Logical Form of the
utterance of E] and integrates it into a description of
the form The speaker is asking Wh-P, where Wh-P is an
indirect question". (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 252)
Importantly, not every expression has
illocutionary force. We will say that an expression E
has illocutionary force if and only if there is some
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assumption schema S(P) such that hearers, upon
encoantering utterances of E, automatically embed the
utterance's propositional form in S(P).
2.1.4 Summary
We can now summarize Sperber and Wilson's views on
interpretation. Utterance interpretation, they
maintain, involves two kinds of processes: namely
decoding and inference. In the decoding process, the
utterance is assigned a linguistic representation,
including a Phonetic Form, a Syntactic Structure and a
Logical Form. In the inferential process, two things
happen: first, this Logical Form is "filled in" -- it
is disambiguated, enriched and reference is assigned --
yielding the propositional form of the utterance.
Second, an illocutionary force is selected for the
utterance.
In selecting the illocutionary force of the
utterance, decoding and inference also play a part.
The decoding process provides the illocutionary force
of the expression used, in the form of an assumption
schema into which the propositional form is embedded --
assuming the expression used has an illocutionary
force. The propositional form of the utterance
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replaces the variable in this assumption schema,
resulting in an assumption. This assumption furnishes
the hearer with a first hypothesis about what
linguistic act the speaker intended to perform.
This first hypothesis is checked in the
inferential process, and either accepted or rejected.
If rejected, the hearer attempts to find the actual set
of assumptions communicated -- by making inferences; a
process we will not discuss here.23
2.2 The Principle of Relevance
We have introduced the two processes involved in
interpretation. But we have not explained how,
according to Sperber and Wilson, the processes are
executed. As we said, for the most part Sperber and
Wilson treat decoding as a "black box". Its task is to
furnish the linguistic representation of the utterance,
including its Logical Form. Generally speaking, we can
23 It is of course true that hearers often recover more than
the explicit content of an utterance. They may also recover
IMPLICATURES. Recall Grice's (1975: 33) classic example. A
professor of philosophy writes a letter of recommendation for his
student, Mr. X. The whole content of the letter is: "Dear Sir,
Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at
tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc." If a selection
committee recovered only the explicature of such an utterar~-
they would not correctly understand it. The selection co r1 .. e
must understand what the referee meant by these words, in thiz
situation: viz. that Mr. X is not a worthy candidate.
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abstract away from how it achieves this task. In what
follows, therefore, we focus upon the inferential
process.
The hearer develops Logical Forms into
propositional forms by applying the PRINCIPLE OF
RELEVANCE. As Sperber and Wilson (1986: 184) put it,
"the right propositional form is the one that leads to
an overall interpretation which is consistent with the
principle of relevance".
To understand the principle of relevance, we will
need the notions of relevance and manifestness.
2.2.1 Relevance
An ASSUMPTION, for Sperber and Wilson, is one kind
of propositional form. A propositional form is an
assumption for some individual if and only if that
individual treats that propositional form as a possibly
accurate representation of the actual world.
Some propositional forms can be entertained by an
individual, without being assumptions for that
individual. For instance, propositional forms about
fictitious characters are not assumptions for
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individuals who know that the characters are
fictitious; that is because they do not treat such
propositional forms as possibly accurate
representations of the actual world. (Sperber and
Wilson 1986: 2)
The set of assumptions which an individual holds
to be true or probably true at a given time constitute
that person's CONTEXT. Contexts change over time: new
assumptions are added, old ones removed. CONTEXTUAL
EFFECTS are changes to a context which improve it.
Contextual effects arise is three different ways.
1. New information may interact with old information,
and introduce new assumptions into the context
2. New information may provide evidence for an
assumption already present in the context
3. New information may provide evidence against an
assumption, and may result in its removal from the
context.
Armed with the notions of context and contextual
effect, we can introduce RELEVANCE.
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(54) RELEVANCE:
Extent Condition 1: An assumption is RELEVANT in a
context to the extent that its contextual effects in
that context are large.
Extent Condition 2: An assumption is RELEVANT in a
context to the extent that the effort required to
process it in this context is small. (Sperber and
Wilson 1986: 125)
Thus, for an assumption to be relevant in a
context, it must have some contextual effect in that
context. And, ceteris paribus, the more contextual
effects an assumption has in a context, the more
relevant it is in that context. Furthermore, the less
processing required in achieving the contextual effect
in question, the more relevant the assumption.
2.2.2 Manifestness
Sperber and Wilson (1986: 39) say that an
assumption is L-ANIFEST to an individual at a given time
if and only if she is capable of representing it
mentally and accepting its representation as true or
probably true at that time. Therefore, an assumption A
92
is manifest to an individual I if (a) I actually holds
A true or probably true or (b) I could reasonably hold
A true or probably true, at the time and place in
question.
There are several ways that an assumption may be
manifest to an individual. It may be perceptible in
the physical environment; it may be inferable from
assumptions which are already manifest; or, it may be
retrievable from memory. It is important to stress the
modality at work in this definition: to be manifest, an
assumption need not have been already perceived,
remembered or inferred. Rather, what is required for
manifestness is the mere possibility that the
assumption be perceived, inferred or remembered.
Manifestness, according to Sperber and Wilson,
admits of degrees. Assumptions which are more likely
to be held true are more manifest. Consider an
example. It may be manifest to Watson that Holmes is
holding a pipe, but more manifest to him that Holmes is
speaking -- because Watson is more likely to hold this
latter assumption true. In all likelihood, it will be
less manifest to Dr. Watson that Holmes is not a raven.
Not because Watson harbors any doubt; only because he
is unlikely to even entertain the possibility that
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Holmes is a raven. Nevertheless, Watson is capable of
considering this assumption, however absurd. Hence it
is manifest to him, albeit very slightly.
Sperber and Wilson define an individual's
COGNITIVE ENVIRONMENT as the set of assumptions that
are manifest to her. Notice that a person's cognitive
environment contains her context, since every
assumption which is actually held true or probably true
in a situation is an assumption which could be held
true or probably true in that situation.
Sperber and Wilson stress that an assumption can
be manifest to more than one individual. Let us agree
that both Holmes and Watson are capable of perceiving a
dagger, sitting on a chair. Hence, that the dagger is
on the chair is manifest to both of them. Since a
cognitive environment is a set of manifest assumptions,
and the same assumptions can be manifest to more than
one person, a group of people may share a cognitive
environment. Sperber and Wilson define a shared
cognitive environment of a group G as the assumptions
which are manifest to every member of G.
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2.2.3 Mutual Manifestness
Some cognitive environments are not only shared;
they are MUTUAL. As Sperber and Wilson put it,
Any shared cognitive environment in which it
is manifest which people share it is what we
will call a mutual cognitive environment. In
a mutual cognitive environment, for every
manifest assumption, the fact that it is
manifest to the people who share this
environment is itself manifest. (1986: 41-42)
Given all of this, Sperber and Wilson (1986: 42),
define a MUTUALLY MANIFEST assumption: an assumption is
mutually manifest if and only if it is an assumption in
a mutual cognitive environment.
Recall the dagger on the chair. The following
things, among others, are manifest to both Holmes and
Watson:
Assumption A: The dagger is on the chair
Assumption B: It is manifest to both Holmes and Watson
that it is manifest to both Holmes and Watson that the
dagger is on the chair.
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It is manifest to Holmes that these two
assumptions are shared by Watson and himself. And it
is manifest to Watson that these two assumptions are
shared by Holmes and himself. That is, it is manifest
to both of them that these two assumptions constitute a
shared cognitive environment for them. (Not their only
shared cognitive environment, to be sure. But one of
them.) So every assumption in this cognitive
environment (i.e. assumptions A and B) is mutually
manifest to Watson and Holmes.
Given the notions of manifestness and relevance,
we can now state Sperber and Wilson's (1986: 158)
PRINCIPLE OF RELEVANCE.
(55) Presumption of Optimal Relevance:
(a) The set of assumptions {I} which the communicator
intends to make manifest to the addressee is relevant
enough to make it worth the addressee's while to
process the ostensive stimulus.24
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the
communicator could have used to communicate {I}.
24 An OSTENSIVE STIMULUS is defined as any stimulus which
makes manifest an intention to make something manifest. See
Sperber and Wilson (1986: 49) for discussion.
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(56) Principle of Relevance:
Every act of ostensive communication communicates the
presumption of its own optimal relevance.
If communication is to succeed, the speaker must
communicate the presumption of optimal relevance. That
is, he must communicate (a) that he is communicating
assumptions which are relevant enough, and (b) that he
has chosen the most efficient means for communicating
these assumptions. Why is this so, according to
Sperber and Wilson?
Let us begin with part (a) of the presumption of
optimal relevance. Sperber and Wilson write,
It is manifest that an act of ostensive
communication cannot succeed unless the
audience pays attention to the ostensive
stimulus. It is manifest that people will
pay attention to a phenomenon only if it
seems relevant to them. It is manifest,
then, that a communicator who produces an
ostensive stimulus must intend it to seem
relevant to her audience: that is, must
intend to make it manifest to the audience
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that the stimulus is relevant. Adding a
layer of mutuality to this account, let us
suppose that it is not merely manifest but
mutually manifest to communicator and
audience that an ostensive stimulus is being
produced. Then it is not merely manifest but
mutually manifest that the communicator must
intend the stimulus to seem relevant to the
audience: that is, must intend it to be
manifest to the audience that the stimulus is
relevant. (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 156)
The idea, in less technical language, is the
following: if the speaker is to succeed in
communicating, he must persuade his audience to
interpret his utterance. This requires convincing that
audience to expend the necessary interpretive effort.
Sperber and Wilson claim that speakers convince the
audience by making it mutually manifest that the
speaker intends to communicate assumptions which are
relevant to the audience.
Sperber and Wilson are aware, of course, that
speakers do not always communicate in good faith: a
speaker may claim his audience's attention without
having anything truly relevant to communicate. But,
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they maintain, unless a speaker at least pretends to be
aiming for relevance, he will fail to communicate
anything.25
2.2.4 Why Optimal Relevance?
So much for part (a) of the presumption of optimal
relevance. Let us now consider part (b). According to
Sperber and Wilson, if communication is to succeed, a
speaker must communicate that his utterance is the most
relevant stimulus available for communicating the set
of assumptions {I}. Why is this?
According to Sperber and Wilson, the most
effective stimulus for communicating some set of
assumptions {I} is the stimulus which makes it "as easy
as possible for the addressee to understand" {I}.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 157) And the stimulus which
makes it easy as possible for the addressee to
understand {I} is precisely the one which requires the
least processing effort. Finally, the stimulus which
requires the least processing effort to recover {I} is
25 Sperber and Wilson point out that speakers need not know
the principle of relevance. As they say, "It is not the general
principle, but the fact that a particular presumption of
relevance has been communicated by and about a particular act of
communication, that the audience uses in inferential
comprehension". (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 162)
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the most relevant stimulus capable of making {I}
manifest. In a word, the following identities hold:
(57) The most effective stimulus for communicating {I}
= the stimulus which makes it as easy as possible for
the addressee to understand (I)
(58) The stimulus which makes it as easy as possible
for the addressee to understand {I} = the stimulus
which requires the least processing effort to recover
{I}
(59) The stimulus which requires the least processing
effort to recover {I) = the most relevant stimulus for
making {I} manifest
By transitivity of identity,
(60) The most effective stimulus for communicating {I)
= the most relevant stimulus for making {I} manifest
Now, if the speaker wishes to successfully
communicate a set of assumptions {I), then she will
undoubtedly select the most effective stimulus
available for communicating {I}. And, as we just
showed, the most effective stimulus for communicating
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{I} is the most relevant stimulus for making {I}
manifest. So, if the speaker wishes to successfully
communicate, she will select the most relevant stimulus
for making {I} manifest.
This establishes that a speaker must choose the
most relevant stimulus available -- if he wishes to
communicate successfully. But Sperber and Wilson make
a stronger claim. They maintain that speakers
inevitably communicate that they are using the most
relevant stimulus available. why this extra step?
Sperber and Wilson (1986: 157) answer as follows:
An addressee who doubts that the communicator
has chosen the most relevant stimulus
[available] -- a hearer, say, who believes
that he is being addressed with deliberate
and unnecessary obscurity -- might doubt that
genuine communication was intended, and might
justifiably refuse to make the processing
effort required. All of this i3 mutually
manifest; it is therefore mutually manifest
that the communicator intends it to be
manifest to the addressee that she has chosen
the most relevant stimulus capable of
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fulfilling her intentions.
That is, by communicating that she has chosen the
most relevant stimulus, the speaker helps to insure
that the hearer will interpret her. For, if she fails
to communicate this -- if, for example, the hearer
takes her to be using a less than optimally relevant
stimulus -- the hearer may not make the necessary
interpretive effort. So, speakers not only inevitably
select the most relevant stimulus available; they
inevitably communicate that they have selected the most
relevant stimulus available.
By assuming that the promise of optimal relevance
was made in good faith, the hearer can eliminate
certain hypotheses about what a speaker might have
meant. In particular, she can reject any hypothesis
which would have the speaker violating the presumption
of optimal relevance.
But, it might be thought, this criterion leaves a
multitude of possible interpretations, all of which are
consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance.
If many interpretations satisfy this demand, how does
the hearer select a single interpretation?
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In response to this question, Sperber and Wilson
(1986: 167) argue that there is only ever one set of
assumptions which is truly consistent with the
presumption of optimal relevance: the only set {I}
consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance is
the first set of assumptions {I} which is relevant
enough.
2.2.5 Accessibility
This talk of "the first" presupposes some ordering
of sets of assumptions. The ordering is in terms of
ACCESSIBILITY. Sperber and Wilson (1986: 77) write
that, "A more accessible assumption is one that is
easier to recall". They add, "...the more a
representation is processed, the more accessible it
becomes".
It is not wholly clear what accessibility comes
to. But the intuitive idea can be brought out as
follows. Some assumptions are more easily brought to
consciousness than others; furthermore, some
assumptions can be retrieved from long term memory with
ease, while others require significant effort.
Similarly, some assumptions can easily be introduced
into an individual's context; other assumptions could
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become part of the individual's context only with a
good deal of effort.
Those assumptions which require less effort to
become part of an individual's context at a given time
are more accessible for that individual at that time.
Sperber and Wilson maintain that hearers begin by
testing the most accessible set of assumptions, in this
sense of "accessible". If this set of assumptions is
not consistent with the presumption of optimal
relevance, the hearer goes to the next most accessible
set, and tests it. This continues, until a set of
assumptions is found which is consistent with the
presumption of optimal relevance. The most accessible
set of assumptions which is consistent with the
presumption of optimal relevance is the only one
consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance.
And it is the set of assumptions being communicated.
2.2.6 Uniqueness
Why, according to Sperber and Wilson, is the most
accessible set of assumptions the only set of
assumptions consistent with the presumption of optimal
relevance? They write,
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An addressee... who wants to maximize
cognitive efficiency, will test hypotheses in
order of accessibility. Suppose he arrives
at a hypothesis which is consistent with the
principle of relevance. Should he stop
there, or go on and test the next hypothesis
on the grounds that it might be consistent
with the principle of relevance too? It is
easy to show that he should stop there.
Suppose he does go on, and finds another
hypothesis which verifies the first part of
the presumption of relevance: the putative
set {I} is relevant enough. In these
circumstances, the second part of the
presumption of relevance is almost invariably
falsified. If it was at all possible, the
communicator should have used a stimulus
which would have saved the addressee the
effort of first accessing two hypotheses
consistent with the principle of relevance,
and then having to choose between them.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 167-168)
This argument goes by rather fast, and it
establishes a rather important conclusion. So let us
unpack it. Sperber and Wilson want to establish the
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conclusion below:
Conclusion: The first interpretation of an utterance U
which is consistent with the presumption of optimal
relevance is the only interpretation consistent with
the presumption of optimal relevance. Therefore, for
any U, there is only one interpretation of U consistent
with the presumption of optimal relevance.
To establish this conclusion, let us assume that
there is some utterance u which has two interpretations
consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance.
From this assumption we derive a contradiction.
Premise 1: There is at least one utterance u such that
u has two interpretations consistent with the
presumption of optimal relevance: {Il} and {12}.
Sperber and Wilson then observe that, "almost
inevitably":
Premise 2: There exists some other utterance u' such
that {12} is the first interpretation of u' consistent
with the presumption of optimal relevance
Sperber and Wilson include the hedge "almost
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invariably" because of situations in which the
communicator has at his disposal a very limited range
of stimuli with which to communicate. When this
happens, there may be no stimulus that has {12} as its
most accessible interpretation. Sperber and Wilson
maintain, however, that natural languages are not
limited in this way.26
Sperber and Wilson then point out that finding the
first interpretation of u consistent with the
presumption of optimal relevance (i.e. finding {Il}),
rejecting it, and finally finding {12} involves more
processing effort than finding the first interpretation
of u' consistent with the presumption of optimal
relevance (i.e. finding {12}). In a word:
Premise 3: Interpreting u as communicating {12}
requires more processing effort than interpreting u' as
communicating {I2}
Now, recall extent condition 2 of the definition
26 Sperber and Wilson further claim that when stimuli are
restricted -- e.g. when the code used is not a natural language -
- communication may simply fail. They maintain, moreover, that
when communication succeeds in these situations, the communicated
set of assumptions is precisely the first set consistent with the
presumption of optimal relevance. Since our concern is with
natural language, however, we will not rehearse those arguments
here.
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of relevance: an assumption is relevant in a context to
the extent that the effort required to process it in
this context is small. (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 125)
So, by premise 3, u' is more relevant than u, when both
are taken as communicating {I2}. But then it is not
true that {I2} is an interpretation of u which meets
the presumption of optimal relevance. For there exists
a more relevant means of communicating {I2}, viz. u'.
This contradicts premise 1.
This argument establishes that, for any utterance
u, there cannot be two interpretations of u consistent
with the presumption of optimal relevance. There can
be only one. And that one is the first interpretation
that passes the test.
Consider an example. Suppose Joe wishes to
communicate the set of assumptions {A} by using the
sentence S in circumstances C. Joe realizes that,
given his audience's initial context and cognitive
environment, {A} is not very accessible in C. Indeed,
let us assume that, in C, (A) is the third most
accessible set of assumptions which is relevant enough
to warrant processing the utterance. That is, before
getting to {A}, the hearer will recover two other (more
accessible) sets of assumptions, both of which are
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relevant enough to warrant the effort expended.
Sperber and Wilson maintain that if Joe uses S in C to
make {A} manifest, he will violate the second part of
the presumption of optimal relevance. His utterance
will not be the most relevant stimulus for making {A}
manifest in C, because, "almost inevitably", there
exists some sentence S' such that, given C, (A} would
be the first interpretation of an utterance of S'
consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance.
Hence, in C, an utterance of S' is a more relevant
stimulus than an utterance of S, because an utterance
of S' does not require the hearer to access two prior
sets of assumptions that are relevant enough.
2.3 Summary
Let us now sum up. Linguistic interpretation
occurs as follows: the hearer assigns a linguistic
representation to the utterance. This is the decoding
process. Part of the linguistic representation of the
utterance is its Logical Form, the departure point for
the inferential process. The Logical Form is developed
-- that is to say, it is disambiguated, enriched, and
reference and force are assigned -- by using the most
accessible assumptions. The resulting completed
Logical Form is tested to see if it meets the
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presumption of optimal relevance. If it does not, then
the next most accessible development of the Logical
Form is tested. This process continues until a
completed Logical Form is found which is consistent
with the presumption of optimal relevance. At this
point, the interpreter stops: she has arrived at what
the speaker asserted.
3 A Note on Empirical Commitments
Obviously, relevance theory may turn out to be
incorrect -- particularly about details. Similarly' for
X-bar theory. These are, after all, empirical
theories. And empirical theories are always open to
refutation. It is reasonable to inquire, therefore,
how much our conclusions rest upon the minutia of these
theories.
The details are not, we think, essential. For the
sake of explicitness, it is important to adopt a single
framework. And we do believe that relevance theory and
X-bar theory are the most promising, most specific and
most accurate of those available. But, so far as we
can see anyway, our conclusions do not stand or fall
with the specifics of these particular theories.
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Nevertheless, certain tenets of these theories are
vital.
3.1 The Syntax and Semantics of Phrases
With respect to the syntax and semantics of
phrases, two things are indispensable. First, our
conclusions presuppose a distinction between:
(a) syntactic words and phrases on the one hand, and
syntactic sentences on the other
(b) semantic words and phrases on the one hand, and
semantic sentences on the other
If mature linguistic theory rejects these distinctions,
then the dispute between the Thesis and the Counter
Thesis cannot even be made sense of, for there is
nothing to disagree about. It is extremely likely,
however, that whatever path syntax and semantics may
take, such a distinction will be drawn.
Assuming there is such a distinction, it is
exceedingly likely that at least some words and phrases
(as characterized by the correct syntactic and semantic
theory -- whatever it is) can be used in isolation to
make assertions. For example: only a very radical
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revision of the notion of phrase would result in (6)
through (9) not being phrases.
(6) John's father
(7) Nice work
(8) Very fast
(9) From Spain
But each of (6) through (9) can be used to assert.
Or so it appears. Even if just these four and no
others are ultimately classified as phrases, it would
still be the case that some semantic phrases and some
syntactic phrases can be used in isolation to make
assertions. Hence the Thesis would be true and the
Counter Thesis would be false.
3.2 Relevance Theory
Ordinary words and phrases do not express
propositions. Yet, if we are correct, speakers can use
ordinary words and phrases to assert propositions.
Hence, if we are right, when someone makes an assertion
by uttering an ordinary word or phrase there is an
important gap between the thought which is asserted and
the meaning (in the circumstances of use) of the
expression used. The central contribution of relevance
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theory is to explain how this gap is bridged.
We take relevance theory to be plausible. Hence
we also take our conclusions to be plausible. But
notice: our conclusions do not rest on the supposition
that the supplementing of non-propositional meanings
occurs exactly as relevance theory describes it.
On the other hand: our conclusions do rest on the
supposition that "supplementing" or "bridging the gap"
can occur somehow or other. This latter supposition,
however, is reasonable enough.
Here is why: communicators exhibit powerful
inferential abilities; when, e.g., they communicate
non-linguistically, or when they communicate by
uttering indexical sentences, ambiguous sentences, or
sentences that must be enriched. These inferential
abilities -- whatever their precise character may be --
are surely sufficient to permit hearers to take the
non-propositional meaning of ordinary words and
phrases, fill in some missing element, and arrive at
the proposition asserted. Regardless of how this
process takes place, if -- as seems likely -- it can
take place then our conclusions are vindicated.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE SYNTACTIC ELLIPSIS HYPOTHESIS
...we obviously cannot correctly
talk of the expression "the king of
France" being used to express a
true or false proposition, since in
general only sentences can be used
truly or falsely. (Strawson 1956:
224)
1 Introduction
Recall the ellipsis hypothesis, repeated below:
(5) The Ellipsis Hypothesis: Whenever a speaker makes
an assertion by uttering an (apparent) word or phrase
in isolation, what that speaker really utters is an
elliptical sentence.
The ellipsis hypothesis can be interpreted in two
rather different ways; one syntactic, the other
semantic. Using the notions of Syntactic Structure,
semantic type, illocutionary force and linguistic
representation, we can state the two construals of the
ellipsis hypothesis as follows:
(5 a) The Syntactic Ellipsis Hypothesis: Whenever a
speaker makes an assertion by uttering an (apparent)
word or phrase in isolation, what that speaker really
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utters is an elliptical sentence in the sense that the
linguistic representation of her utterance has a
Syntactic Structure that is headed by INFL.
(5 b) The Semantic Ellipsis Hypothesis: Whenever a
speaker makes an assertion by uttering an (apparent)
word or phrase in isolation, what that speaker really
utters is an elliptical sentence in the sense that (a)
the semantic type of the linguistic representation of
her utterance is propositional and (b) the linguistic
representation of her utterance has illocutionary
force.
These are, so far as we know, the only possible
construals of the ellipsis hypothesis. Hence, if both
of these are incorrect, then the ellipsis hypothesis is
false.
The burden of this chapter will be to argue
against the syntactic ellipsis hypothesis. We postpone
discussion of the semantic ellipsis hypothesis until
Chapter Four.
116
2 Two Syntactic Ellipsis Hypotheses
In this section we will introduce two syntactic
ellipsis hypotheses. Each spells out the idea that
when speakers (appear to) utter words and phrases in
isolation, the linguistic representation of t:heir
utterance is syntactically sentential. First, however,
a word about notational conventions. In what follows,
we will represent the Syntactic Structure and Logical
Form of utterances by a labelled bracketing (or,
equivalently, by a tree).27 For example, suppose John
says the sentence,
(61) Snow is white
We use either of the following notations to give the
Syntactic Structure and Logical Form of John's
utterance:
27 Propositional forms are Logical Forms which express
propositions. Being a kind of Logical Form, they too will be
represented as tree structures or labelled bracketings.
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NP I'
[, / \
snow I VP
tense V AP
i I
i I
be white
(63) [IP [NP snow] [I, [I tense/agreement] [,P be [AP
white] ] ]
We use English orthography in italics to give the
Phonetic Form of utterances. The Phonetic Form of
John's utterance, for example, would be given by snow
is white.
To give the complete linguistic representation of
an utterance, we use an ordered triple consisting of a
Logical Form, a Syntactic Structure and a Phonetic Form
-- in that order. (Where the Logical Form and
Syntactic Structure are the same, we omit the Syntactic
Structure.) Here, for example, is the linguistic
representation of John's utterance:28
(64) <[z, Snow is white], snow is white>
28 Obviously these representations leave out much detail;
particularly the representation of the Phonetic Form.
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(62) IP
Linguistic representations fall into different
classes. In particular, we can classify some as
syntactically sentential and others as syntactically
lexical or phrasal. A linguistic representation is
SYNTACTICALLY SENTENTIAL if and only if its Syntactic
Structure tree is headed by an inflectional element,
where -- as we saw -- inflection elements include
modals, tense and verb-subject agreement. (For further
discussion, see Chomsky (1981).)
Paradigm examples of linguistic representations
that are syntactically sentential are given in (64) and
(65):
(64) <[,P Snow is white], snow is white>
(65) <[IP That dog is hungry], that dog is hungry>
2.1 Version I: The Deletion Hypothesis
We will say that a linguistic representation r is
SHORTENED if and only if there exists another
linguistic representation r' such that r' has a longer
Phonetic Form than r, but r' has the same Syntactic
Structure as r.9
* We leave open the question of how precisely the notion of
length should be explicated, relying in what follows on an
intuitive understanding of this notion.
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Examples (66) and (67) are paradigmatic of
shortened linguistic representations:
(66) <[,p She does not smoke], She doesn't smoke>
(67) <[,p John thinks [cp that snow is white], John
thinks snow is white>
These are shortened because there are other
linguistic representations -- e.g. (68) and (69) --
which have the same Syntactic Structure, but a longer
Phonetic Form:
(68) <[,p She does not smoke], She does not smoke>
(69) <[,p John thinks [cp that snow is white], John
thinks that snow is white>
The Phonetic Form of (68) is longer than that of
(66), in the sense that only the latter exhibits
contraction; the Phonetic Form of (69) is longer than
that of (67) because the word "that" is not
phonetically present in (67). Hence, (66) and (67) are
shortened linguistic representations.
Given the notions of syntactically sentential
linguistic representations and shortened linguistic
representations, we can now state the first version of
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the ellipsis hypothesis:
(5 a.i) The Syntactic Ellipsis Hypothesis, Version I:
The Deletion Hypothesis: Whenever a speaker makes an
assertion by uttering an (apparent) word or phrase in
isolation, what that speaker really utters is an
elliptical sentence in the sense that the linguistic
representation of her utterance is syntactically
sentential, but it is shortened.
It is the "shortening", of course, that explains
why the result does not "sound like" an ordinary
sentence -- even though the utterance is syntactically
sentential.
Let us take an example of an utterance of an
(apparent) word or phrase in isolation. Imagine that
John (appears to) utter the phrase "An emergency
generator shutdown" in isolation. On the deletion
hypothesis, John's utterance has the Phonetic Form
given in (70) and the Syntactic Structure given in
(71):
(70) An emergency generator shutdown
(71) [,, There [,, INFL I[ be an emergency generator
shutdown] ]]
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Notice that there is (at least) one other Phonetic
Form that shares this Syntactic Structure. It is given
in (72).
(72) There is an emergency generator shutdown
The Phonetic Form in (72) is longer than the one
in (70). But both share the Syntactic Structure (71).
Hence, by the definition of "shortened", the linguistic
representation of John's utterance is shortened.
Notice, however, that the Syntactic Structure of (71) -
- the Syntactic Structure of John's utterance -- is
headed by INFL. Hence the linguistic representation of
this utterance is syntactically sentential. Therefore,
what the speaker really uttered was not a phrase at
all; it was an elliptical sentence.
To summarize: the deletion hypothesis holds that
the linguistic representation of any actual or possible
assertoric utterance of an (apparent) word or phrase is
syntactically sentential, but shortened. The utterance
is syntactically sentential in the sense that its
Syntactic Structure is headed by INFL. And it is
shortened in the sense that there exists another
linguistic representation with the same Syntactic
Structure, but a longer Phonetic Form. Being
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shortened, the utterance does not sound like an
utterance of a sentence. But, despite appearances, it
is an utterance of a sentence.
2.2 Version II: The Empty Element Hypothesis
We now present another construal of the syntactic
ellipsis hypothesis. We begin by introducing the
notion of phonologically null (or "empty") elements.
PHONOLOGICALLY NULL ELEMENTS are syntactic items that
have no phonetic "spell out"; that is to say, no sound
corresponds to them. Hence, though present in the
Syntactic Structure, they are never heard.
Recent research has suggested that natural
languages exhibit several different kinds of empty
elements. Let us consider one paradigm example: the
element PRO in English.
One of the places PRO occurs, at least in English,
is the subject position of embedded infinitival
clauses. For example:
(73) [,1 John1 wants [IP [P PRO1] to leave]
The crucial point is the following: though PRO is
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syntactically present, we do not hear it when someone
says the sentence "John wants to leave". That is
because PRO has no phonetic spell out.
Giving the notion of phonologically null elements,
we may now state the second version of the ellipsis
hypothesis: the empty element hypothesis.
(5 a.ii) The Syntactic Ellipsis Hypothesis, Version II:
The Empty Element Hypothesis: Whenever a speaker makes
an assertion by uttering an (apparent) word or phrase
in isolation, what that speaker really utters is an
elliptical sentence in the sense that the linguistic
representation of her utterance is syntactically
sentential, but that Syntactic Structure contains a
number of phonologically null (i.e. "empty") elements.
Here is an example. According to the empty
element hypothesis, the tree in (74) gives the
Syntactic Structure of an assertoric utterance of the
(apparent) phrase "From Spain". The letter e stands
for the phonologically null (i.e. "empty") element:
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(74)
NP
e
I'
I VP
e V NP
e NP PP
DET N P NP
I I I I
I I I I
e e from Spain
Compare this Syntactic Structure with
utterances of the (ordinary) sentence
from Spain":
(75)
NP
This
IP/ \
that of
"This is a letter
I'/
I
agr
tense
VP
V NP
/ \
be NP PP
DET N P NP
I I I I
I I I I
a letter from Spain
The trees are the same, except that many of the
bottom nodes in (74) dominate phonologically null
elements. This explains why an utterance having the
Syntactic Structure in (74) sounds different from one
that has the Syntactic Structure given in (75).
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In sum: on both the deletion and empty element
hypotheses, all utterances are sentential,
syntactically speaking. That is to say, the Syntactic
Structure of every utterance is headed by INFL. The
difference between the two ellipsis hypotheses is the
means they employ to explain why one does not hear the
subject and inflected verb, even though they are
syntactically present. Where the deletion hypothesis
introduces shortened linguistic representations, the
empty element hypothesis posits phonologically null
elements.
3 Against the Empty Element Hypothesis
In the following sections we will encounter
objections -- both empirical and methodological -- that
apply to both the empty element hypothesis and the
deletion hypothesis. First, however, we should like to
make some methodological remarks that apply
specifically to the empty element hypothesis.
There are two good methodological reasons for not
adopting the empty element hypothesis.
First, this hypothesis introduces a new kind of
empty element into the theory. We know it is new
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because no previously known element is dominated by all
of N, P, I, DET, V, A and so on. Hypothesizing a new
empty element is ad hoc, since the only reason for
hypothesizing it is to account for the assertoric use
of (apparent) words and phrases in isolation.
It might be said that, at least when it is
dominated by N, e is independently required. But even
here, the hypothesis requires introducing another kind
of empty element. The four familiar empty elements
that are dominated by N are: wh-trace, NP-trace, PRO
and pro. But e can be none of these.
English is not a pro-drop language. If it were,
sentences like (76) would be grammatical.
(76) * [,p pro is sleeping]
Hence e cannot be pro.
And e cannot be either an NP or wh- trace either.
First, because no movement has taken place in sentence
(74). Second, because traces require antecedents,
whereas e does not. Third, because e does not share a
theta role with any overt element, but is itself
assigned a theta role. (Traces do not get assigned
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theta roles on their own. I.e. a trace cannot form a
single member chain.) All of these properties are
exhibited by the empty element dominated by N in the
sentence (74), repeated here:
(77) [IP [NP e] [I, [ e] [[e] [v e [NP [NP e] [pp from
Spain]]]]]
The empty element e cannot be PRO either. PRO can
sometimes occur without an antecedent, as sentence (78)
shows.
(78) [PRO to sleep now] would be dangerous
But, by the PRO theorem, PRO cannot be governed. (For
introductory discussions of the PRO theorem, see Lasnik
and Uriagereka (1988: 52-54) and Haegeman (1991:
251ff).) Both the NP positions in (74), however, are
governed. We know this because overt NPs can occur in
these positions -- as (75) shows. (Overt NPs can only
appear in case marked sites; and case marked sites are
necessarily governed, because case is assigned under
government.)
So e, if it exists, is a hitherto unfamiliar empty
element. The only reason provided for positing e is to
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account for the fact that speakers (appear to) make
assertions with (and hearers appear to construe) words
and phrases in isolation. So their introduction into
the theory is not independently motivated.
This phenomenon can be explained without positing
e by agreeing that words and phrases can be used in
isolation to make assertions. And, as we shall see,
there are independent reasons -- beyond the fact that
speakers appear to actually assertorically utter
ordinary words and phrases -- for thinking that
speakers can assertorically utter ordinary words and
phrases. As we explain in Chapter Five, a typical
speaker has the ability to assert by uttering ordinary
words or phrases, even if she never chooses to actually
make a lexical or phrasal assertion. Hence the
introduction of e is not only ad hoc; it is completely
unnecessary.
Let us stress: our objection is not that positing
empty elements is, generally speaking, methodologically
promiscuous. The postulation of an empty element may
be independently motivated; and this postulation may
explain facts which would otherwise remain unexplained.
But the particular phonologically null element
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which the empty element hypothesis appeals to is not
independently motivated. This empty element does allow
one to claim that when speakers (appear to) utter words
and phrases in isolation, they are actually producing
elliptical sentences. But it serves no other purpose.
And the phenomenon which the empty element hypothesis
accounts for -- the fact that people appear to utter
and construe words and phrases in isolation -- can be
explained without appeal to empty elements. This is
one very good methodological reason for rejecting the
empty element hypothesis.
The second reason is that the empty element
hypothesis posits a phonologically null element which
we know almost nothing about; in fact, the only thing
we do know is that it appears in linguistic
representations of utterances of (apparent) words and
phrases in isolation.
It remains utterly mysterious, for example, why
this element cannot appear in ordinary sentences. One
would have expected the phonologically null verbs,
inflection, etc. to be ubiquitous. Yet the following
Syntactic Structures are ungrammatical.
(79)
(a) *[p John [,' e] [v, [v e] [Ap tall]]]
I131
(b) *[Ip Steve [z, [I e] [,p be shopping]]
(c) *[IP John comes [pp [p e] France]]
So far as we can see, no plausible constraints can
be placed upon the distribution of e. In particular,
we are at a loss to explain why it cannot appear in
these positions.
Keeping these methodological concerns about the
empty element hypothesis in mind, we now turn to
objections that apply to both it and the deletion
hypothesis.
4 Against Both Syntactic Ellipsis Hypotheses
In this section, we present several arcguments
against both syntactic ellipsis hypotheses. The
arguments will be of two kinds. First, we will see
that the notion of ellipsis called into service is not
plausible. Second, we will see that the syntactic
ellipsis hypotheses has empirically false consequences
about where (apparent) words and phrases in isolation
can acceptably occur.
4.1 The Infinite Ambiguity of Phonetic Forms
One consequence of the syntactic ellipsis
hypothesis is that Phonetic Forms do not uniquely
determine linguistic representations. Given only a
Phonetic Form, there is no way to single out a unique
linguistic representation having that Phonetic Form.
Consider an example. It would follow from the
deletion hypothesis that all of (80a) through (80c) are
well-formed linguistic representations:
(80)
(a) <[,p Mary loves Fred], mary>
(b) <[,p Fred loves Mary], mary>
(c) <[,p Mary detests Steve], mary>
We know that these linguistic representations would
exist, on the deletion hypothesis, because the Phonetic
Form Mary can serve as a reply to any of the following
questions:
(81)
(a) Who loves Fred?
(b) Who does Fred love?
(c) Who detests Steve?
If a speaker responds to (81a) with the Phonetic Form
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Mary, his utterance -- on the deletion hypothesis --
has the Logical Form [,p Mary loves Fred]. That the
utterance has this Logical Form in this context is
clear because, in saying Mary, the speaker asserts that
Mary loves Fred.
On the other hand, if a speaker responds to (81b)
with an utterance that has the Phonetic Form Mary, then
that utterance must (on this view) have the Logical
Form [jp Fred loves Mary]. That is because, in saying
Mary in this context, the speaker asserts that Fred
loves Mary.
So, given that utterances with the Phonetic Form
Mary can serve as an answer to any of (81 a-c), there
must be at least three linguistic representations that
share this Phonetic Form -- if the deletion hypothesis
is correct. But notice: for any given Phonetic Form,
there are an unlimited number of questions to which
utterances with that Phonetic Form can serve as a
reply. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, any Phonetic
Form whatever corresponds to an unlimited number of
Logical Forms.
Each Logical Form has a meaning. And different
Logical Forms have different meanings. So, because
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every Phonetic Form corresponds to infinitely many
different Logical Forms, every Phonetic Form will
correspond to infinitely many meanings.
Recall, for example, that the Phonetic Form Mary
corresponds to the following meanings -- and many many
more:
(82)
(a) that Mary loves Fred
(b) that Fred loves Mary
(c) that Mary detests Steve
The infinite ambiguity of Phonetic Forms holds for
the empty element hypothesis as well. According to
that hypothesis, all of the following linguistic
representations, plus many many more, are shared by the
Phonetic Form mary:
(83) <[IP [Np e] [', [I e] [,v [v e] [Np Mary]]]], mary>
(84) <[IP [NP Mary] [I, [I e] [v, [v e] [Np e]]]], mary>
(85) <[IP [NP e] [(' [I e] [,v [( e] [pp [p e] [Np Mary]]]],
mary>
But the displayed Logical Forms mean different
things. Hence: if either syntactic ellipsis hypothesis
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is true, then to every Phonetic Form there corresponds
an unlimited number of Logical Forms -- and hence an
unlimited number of meanings.
The consequence that Phonetic Forms are infinitely
ambiguous is devastating for the syntactic ellipsis
hypothesis; it renders the view enormously implausible.
4.2 Linguistic Antecedents
Having spelled out the two versions of the
syntactic ellipsis hypothesis in some detail, let us
now consider what they have in common. The syntactic
ellipsis hypothesis, on its broadest construal, can be
paraphrased as follows: utterances of (what appear to
be) words and phrases in isolation actually have
sentential Syntactic Structures. But these utterances
do not sound like utterances of typical sentences
because they are, so to speak, PHONETICALLY ABBREVIATED
when compared with ordinary syntactically sentential
utterances.
The difference between the deletion hypothesis and
the empty element hypothesis has to do with how the
phenomenon of phonetic abbreviation is explained.
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Let us call utterances which fit this broad
construal ELLIPTICAL UTTERANCES. And let us call
linguistic representations of such utterances
ELLIPTICAL EXPRESSIONS. There are good reasons for
thinking that natural languages do contain some
elliptical expressions. VP deletion constructions,
sluicing constructions, and PP deletion constructions
provide prototypical examples. (See especially
Hankemer and Sag (1976) for discussion.)
(86)
(a) VP Deletion: <[p, John does not smoke], John
doesn't>
(b) Sluicing: <[IP I wonder when Steve left], I wonder
when>
(c) PP Deletion: <[,p Alex is in France too], Alex is
too>
These paradigm examples of elliptical expressions
share an important characteristic: they cannot appear
in discourse initial position. One cannot walk into a
room and say "I wonder when" or "John doesn't". The
generalization is that elliptical expressions --
linguistic representations which are phonetically
abbreviated in the way described -- cannot acceptably
occur discourse initially. If this generalization is
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correct, then the syntactic ellipsis hypothesis is
mistaken.
We define a DISCOURSE as an ordered n-tuple of
linguistic representations, such that said n-tuple is
not itself an element in an n-tuple. Some discourses
are acceptable, in a rough pretheoretical sense.
Others are unacceptable. (We use "acceptable" and
"unacceptable" rather than "well formed" and "ill-
formed" because we do not wish to take a stand on
whether the unacceptability of discourses derives from
ungrammaticality or from some other source.)
The discourse in (87) is unacceptable, in some
pretheoretical sense. This is predicted by the
generalization, since this discourse (which happens to
consist of a single linguistic representation) begins
with an elliptical expression.
[Mary is holding a gun to her head. Alex says]
(87) *Mary doesn't
The discourse in (6), on the other hand, is
perfectly acceptable.
[Two people are talking at a party. Mary points to a
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man near the door and says]
(6) John's father
Yet, on the syntactic ellipsis hypothesis, this
discourse also begins with an elliptical expression.
So, either the generalization is incorrect, or "John's
father" is not an elliptical expression.
In fact, the generalization does not hold for any
word or phrase. All words and phrases -- even very
complex words and phrases -- are acceptable in
discourse initial position. Several of this unlimited
number of words and phrases are given below.
(88)
(a) An emergency generator shutdown
(b) Another scoop of ice cream
(c) At the house of the seven gables
(d) To my dearest wife of many years, from your loving
husband
(e) Coffee, black, with seven lumps of sugar
(f) Of all the stupid things to say (Quirk et al 1985:
850)
The syntactic ellipsis hypothesis and the
generalization cannot be true together. The evidence
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for the generalization is rather strong: it holds for
all the familiar cases of ellipsis, and fails only when
applied to these controversial cases of (apparent)
words or phrases in isolation. There is, on the other
hand, no independent evidence for the syntactic
ellipsis hypothesis.
4.3 VP Deletion, Sluicing and PP Deletion30
Recall that, by definition, a discourse is an
ordered n-tuple of linguistic representations. Now,
discourses that contain VP deletion, sluicing and PP
deletion constructions are acceptable only if there is
a prior element of the n-tuple that is syntactically
sentential. The following discourses, for example, are
wholly acceptable.
(89) VP Deletion
(a) Jason: We're having french fries with gravy
(b) Mark: And Betty is too
(90) Sluicing
(a) Jason: We're having french fries with gravy
(b) Mark: I wonder when
30 Thanks are due to Tony Bures, who discussed these
examples with me.
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(91) PP Deletion
(a) Jason: Steve is in Washington
(b) Mark: Mary is too
However: these constructions (VP deletion,
sluicing and PP deletion) cannot acceptably occur if
there is no prior syntactically sentential linguistic
representation in the discourse. This provides a sort
of test for syntactically sentential linguistic
representations in prior discourse.
(92) The Test: Take an acceptable discourse D --
containing one of these constructions -- and a
syntactically sentential linguistic representation S
that precedes the construction. Replace the
syntactically sentential linguistic representation S
with an expression E that differs minimally from S. If
the resulting discourse D' is acceptable, then E is a
syntactically sentential linguistic representation.
(Because D' contains a construction that requires, for
acceptability, a prior syntactically sentential
linguistic representation. And, ex hypothesis, the
only candidate is E.) If, on the other hand, the
resulting discourse D' is unacceptable, then E is not a
syntactically sentential linguistic representation.
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This test is not conclusive, of course. The cause
of the unacceptability of D' could be due to some
irrelevant feature of E, or of D', that has nothing to
do with E's status as a syntactic sentence/non-
sentence. But the test does provide some evidence.
Now notice: discourses containing VP deletion
constructions, sluicing constructions and PP deletion
constructions become unacceptable when (apparent) words
and phrases are substituted for ordinary sentences.
Here are examples. The initial element of (89)
and (90) -- the sentence "We're having french fries
with gravy" -- differs minimally from the (apparent)
phrase "French fries with gravy". Yet, if we
substitute the (apparent) phrase "French fries with
gravy" for the sentence in the acceptable discourses
(89) and (90), the result is unacceptable.
(93) VP Deletion
(a) Jason: French fries with gravy
(b) Mark: *And Betty is too
(94) Sluicing
(a) Jason: French fries with gravy
(b) Mark: *I wonder when
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According to our test, "French fries with gravy"
is not syntactically sentential. For if it were, the
discourses (93) and (94) as a whole should be
acceptable. But, in fact, they are unacceptable.
Similarly for (91). When we replace the sentence
"Mary is in Washington" with the (apparent)
Prepositional Phrase "In Washington", the discourse as
a whole becomes unacceptable.
(95) PP Deletion
(a) Jason: In Washington
(b) Mark: *Mary is too
Our test therefore suggests that "In Washington" is not
syntactically sentential.
It might reasonably be replied that, for a
discourse containing one of these constructions to be
acceptable, what is required is the presence of a
special kind of Phonetic Form31 in prior discourse --
call it Phonetic Form of kind K.
But there is a surprising, though very real,
31 Both James Higginbotham and Ken Hale pointed this out to
me, independently.
142
feature of human linguistic communication which hints
that ours is not a test for a certain kind of Phonetic
Form. There are of well-formed bilingual discourses.
Such discourses are, admittedly, quite peculiar. But
they indicate that it is the Logical Form, and not the
Phonetic Form, of preceding linguistic representations
which influences whether a discourse containing VP
deletion, sluicing or PP deletion is acceptable.
Consider the following discourse:
(96)
(a) Andrd: Marie a fini sa these
(b) Bill: And Betty has too
There is a clear sense in which this discourse is
acceptable. Especially if we compare it with (97).
(97)
(a) Andrd: La thbse de Marie
(b) Bill: *And Betty has too
Notice however that in the acceptable discourse
(96) the English verb "to have" is not phonetically
present. Only the French verb "finir" is. It seems
very plausible then that it is not anything about
Phonetic Forms which permits VP deletion, PP deletion
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and sluicing; rather, it is the Logical Form of a
linguistic representation which determines whether it
can be followed by one of these constructions. In
particular, it is not a matter of whether the
linguistic representations have a Phonetic Form of kind
K. Hence our test is indeed a test for syntactically
sentential linguistic representations.
4.4 Non-Sentential Responses
We now turn to examples in which (purported)
syntactically sentential linguistic representations
cannot follow constructions that are known to license
syntactic sentences.
Propositional attitude WH-interrogatives license
syntactically sentential answers. For instance, the
following discourse is acceptable:
(98)
(a) Alex: What does John believe?
(b) Betty: Snow is white
According to the ellipsis hypothesis, nAn emergency
generator shutdown" is syntactically sentential. The
hypothesis therefore predicts that "An emergency
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generator shutdown" can serve as an answer to (99a).
Here again, the proposal runs afoul of the facts.
(99)
(a) Alex: What does John believe?
(b) Betty: *An emergency generator shutdown
5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the syntactic
ellipsis hypothesis, repeated below:
(5 a) The Syntactic Ellipsis Hypothesis: Whenever a
speaker makes an assertion by uttering an (apparent)
word or phrase in isolation, what that speaker really
utters is an elliptical sentence in the sense that the
linguistic representation of her utterance has a
Syntactic Structure that is headed by INFL.
We considered two different versions of this
hypothesis: the deletion hypothesis and the empty
element hypothesis.
(5 a.i) The Syntactic Ellipsis Hypothesis, Version I:
The Deletion Hypothesis: Whenever a speaker makes an
assertion by uttering an (apparent) word or phrase in
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isolation, what that speaker really utters is an
elliptical sentence in the sense that the linguistic
representation of her utterance is syntactically
sentential, but it is shortened.
(5 a.ii) The Syntactic Ellipsis Hypothesis, Version II:
The Empty Element Hypothesis: Whenever a speaker makes
an assertion by uttering an (apparent) word or phrase
in isolation, what that speaker really utters is an
elliptical sentence in the sense that the linguistic
representation of her utterance is syntactically
sentential, but that Syntactic Structure contains a
number of phonologically null (i.e. "empty") elements.
We first argued that the empty element hypothesis
was methodologically promiscuous. Next, we showed that
the machinery required to spell out the syntactic
ellipsis hypothesis has consequences which are
unacceptable (i.e. the idea that every Phonetic Form is
infinitely ambiguous). Finally, we argued that the
syntactic ellipsis hypothesis, in both its variants,
had consequences which were not empirically borne out.
The syntactic ellipsis hypothesis incorrectly entails
that discourses which begin with (apparent) words or
phrases are unacceptable; it incorrectly entails that
(apparent) words and phrases can license VP deletion,
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PP deletion and sluicing; and it incorrectly entails
that (apparent) words and phrases can occur as answers
to propositional attitude WH-interrogatives.
6 Epilogue: Reflexives, Reciprocals and Bound Variable
Readings
In the preceding section on the syntactic ellipsis
hypothesis, we gave evidence that (apparent) words and
phrases do not have sentential Syntactic Structures.
We omitted from consideration one piece of data which
might have been thought relevant: the presence of
reflexives, reciprocals and bound variables within
(apparent) words and phrases that appear in isolation.
Recent work in generative syntax might lead one to
conclude that only syntactically sentential linguistic
representations could contain these elements. Hence
their presence in purported phrases might be thought to
tell against our view that the expressions produced
have non-sentential Syntactic Structures. However the
evidence from reflexives, reciprocals and bound
variable readings is inconclusive.
According to Condition A of the Binding Theory,
reciprocals (e.g. "each other") and reflexives (e.g.
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"herself") must be c-commanded by a Noun Phrase with
which they are co-indexed. (We are, of course, greatly
simplifying the statement of the condition.) Here are
some syntactically sentential examples which violate
this grammatical rule:
(100)
(a) *Himself is shaving
(b) *It seems each other are hitting
The reflexive "himself" is the first word in sentence
(100a). Clearly, then, no Noun Phrase is serving as
the antecedent for it. That is why the sentence is
ungrammatical. As for example (100b), the Noun Phrase
"it" is an expletive element, and hence cannot be co-
indexed with the reciprocal "each other". This
explains why (100b) is ungrammatical.
This rule of grammar -- that reflexives and
reciprocals must be c-commanded by a co-indexed
antecedent -- would appear to give a test for the
presence of "hidden" syntactic material: if a
reciprocal or a reflexive Noun Phrase appears in some
expression without an overt antecedent, and if that
expression is nevertheless well-formed, then we have
evidence for a covert antecedent. Presence of a
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reflexive, or a reciprocal without an antecedent,
should therefore be strong evidence that syntactic
ellipsis of some kind has occurred: the Phonetic Form
can fail to contain the antecedent only because the
Syntactic Structure actually does contain it.
This is roughly the argument Morgan (1973) gives
for an ellipsis analysis of (101b) (We have updated the
notation somewhat):
(101)
(a) Question: Who is Johni looking at?
(b) Answer: Himself i
Morgan claims that the Syntactic Structure of an
utterance of (101b) in this discourse must be the one
given in (102):
(102) [,p John, is looking at himselfi]
If this were not the case, then "himself" -- which is a
reflexive -- would lack an antecedent in (101b), and
the expression should be ill-formed. But, patently, it
is perfectly well-formed.
Reflexives also occur in so-called Negation Phrase
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(NEGP) answers:
(103)
(a) Luke: Who does Bill admire?
(b) John: Not himself
Here again, this suggests that ellipsis has occurred.
For, if (103b) is not elliptical, then it too is an
exception to Condition A.
The case for an ellipsis account of such examples
seems still more compelling when one considers the
following discourse.
(104)
(a) Luke: Who hates his mother?
(b) John: Nobody
The response (104b) has a bound variable reading: the
quantificational Noun Phrase "nobody" appears to act as
a binder for the variable "his". This strongly
suggests that (104b) should be assigned the Logical
Form below:
(105) [IP Nobody, hates his, mother]
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Unless we assign this structure to (104b), it is hard
to see how it comes to have a bound variable reading.
However, assigning this Logical Form to (104b)
constitutes giving an ellipsis treatment of it, because
the corresponding Syntactic Structure is syntactically
sentential.
These considerations are far from decisive,
however. To begin with, there are phrases which
contain reflexives and reciprocals, but which can be
produced in discourse initial position. That they can
occur discourse initially strongly suggests that they
do not result from ellipsis. Examples follow.
First example: Alex is looking through Betty's
photo album. There is a picture of Betty on nearly
every page. Alex complains, after flipping the page,
(106) Another picture of herself!
Second example: Every Tuesday, the same cab driver
picks up John and Steve at the same bar. Each time,
John goes to Steve's home, while Steve goes to John's.
Tonight, as John and Steve climb into the taxi, the
driver asks:32
32 Example due to Chris Collins, in conversation
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(107) To each other's homes again?
There are also expressions that are clearly not
elliptical sentences, but which exhibit bound variable
readings:
(108)
(a) Luke: I love my wife
(b) John: Ditto for everybody
There is no temptation to say that "ditto for
everybody" in (108b) results from ellipsis. (What
could it be elliptical for?). Yet such non-sentences
do exhibit bound variable readings.
These same expressions, though they are clearly
not elliptical sentences, can also contain reflexives
and reciprocals:
(109)
(a) Luke: The barber shaves Bill
(b) John: Ditto for himself
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(110)
(a) Luke: Mary likes Sue, and Bill likes Tracy
(b) John: Ditto for each other
Here again, it seems clear that "Ditto for himself" and
"Ditto for each other" are not elliptical sentences;
their Syntactic Structures are [Ditto for himself] and
[Ditto for each other] respectively. Hence the
presence of reflexives and reciprocals, and of bound
variable readings, are not in themselves convincing
evidence for the ellipsis hypothesis.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE SEMANTIC ELLIPSIS HYPOTHESIS
1 The Proposal
Having argued against both variants of the
syntactic ellipsis hypothesis, we will now consider the
semantic ellipsis hypothesis, repeated below.
(5 b) The Semantic Ellipsis Hypothesis: Whenever a
speaker makes an assertion by uttering an (apparent)
word or phrase in isolation, what that speaker really
utters is an elliptical sentence in the sense that (a)
the semantic type of the linguistic representation of
her utterance is propositional and (b) the linguistic
representation of her utterance has illocutionary
force.
Consider an example. A typical speaker can make
assertions by saying (111) on its own. Let us suppose
Mary says it, thereby asserting that there is a fire
nearby.
(111) Fire
According to the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, this is
not a case of uttering an ordinary word or phrase in
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isolation; rather, what gets produced in this case is a
sentence, in the semantic sense. This sentence
expresses a proposition (in particular, that there is a
fire nearby) and has illocutionary force (in
particular, assertoric force).
Here is a helpful mnemonic: when speakers (appear
to) utter words and phrases in isolation, what they
really produce are one-word or one-phrase sentences.
The semantic type of these one-word and one-phrase
sentences is, we repeat, propositional. And these one-
word and one-phrase sentences have illocutionary force.
(It is in this semantic sense that they are "really"
sentences, and not words and phrases at all.)
So: on the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, the sound
fire is actually ambiguous. On the one hand, the sound
fire corresponds to the ordinary word "fire". That
word is a noun that occurs within sentences. The
semantic type of this noun is type one, an individual
concept. (I.e. the word "fire" denotes some rather
peculiar object.) Furthermore, the ordinary word
"fire" has no illocutionary force at all.
On the other hand, the sound fire also corresponds
to the one-word sentence "fire". The semantic type of
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this one-word sentence is propositional. What's more,
the one-word sentence "fire" has assertoric force.
The semantic ellipsis hypothesis is importantly
different from the syntactic ellipsis hypothesis.
According to the latter, but not the former, utterances
of (apparent) words and phrases inevitably have
sentential Syntactic Structures. That is, only the
syntactic ellipsis hypothesis is committed to the view
that every assertoric utterance has a Syntactic
Structure of the following form:
(112) IP
NP I'
I VP/CP
The contrast between the two hypotheses can be
brought out sharply by applying the question in (113)
to some utterance u.33
(113) What is the subject, verb and inflection of u?
Suppose we ask this question about Mary's assertoric
utterance of "fire".
33 We are indebted to Sylvain Bromberger for this insightful
illustration of the difference between the two ellipsis
hypotheses.
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When asked (113), a proponent of the syntactic
ellipsis hypothesis will reply that the subject of
Mary's utterance is the expletive "there" and the verb
of her utterance is "to be", in present singular.
A proponent of the semantic ellipsis hypothesis,
on the other hand, will reply that the question has a
false presupposition. Mary's utterance, according to
the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, contains no subject,
no verb, and no inflectional element. Mary uttered the
one-word sentence "fire". And, though the one-word
sentence "fire" expresses a proposition and has
assertoric force, it is not a syntactic sentence.
(I.e. its Syntactic Structure is not headed by INFL).
If the semantic ellipsis hypothesis could be
generalized to cover all assertoric utterances of
(apparent) words and phrases, we would entirely
circumvent the objections raised in Chapter One.
Dummett's view that assertion simply is the
production of an assertoric sentence under
conventionally specified conditions would not be
threatened: when speakers (appear to) make assertions
with words and phrases, they are actually producing
semantic sentences. In particular, Dummett might say,
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speakers are producing semantic sentences whose force
is assertoric. If this were true, Dummett's analysis
would straightforwardly apply to these cases: the
speaker's act of asserting consists in his producing a
(semantically elliptical) assertoric sentence under
conventionally specified conditions. (Similar
considerations rescue Evans' principle.)
Notice too that at least one interpretation of
Frege's context principle is salvaged: the claim that
words are meaningful only in the context of a semantic
sentence is not in the least challenged by the
meaningfulness of one-word and one-phrase sentences.
Nor is Russell's theory of descriptions threatened
-- for, if the semantic ellipsis hypothesis is true,
what speakers make assertions with are not descriptions
at all; they are one-phrase sentences that merely sound
the same as ordinary descriptions.
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2 Against the Semantic Ellipsis Hypothesis
2.1 Illocutionary Force
In this section we will argue that when speakers
(appear to) assertorically utter words and phrases in
isolation, the expressions they produce do not have
illocutionary force. As illocutionary force is a
property of semantic sentences, this will establish
that what speakers produce are not semantic sentences.
Recall what we said in Chapter Two about the
illocutionary force of utterances and expressions: an
expression E has illocutionary force if and only if
there is some assumption schema S(P) such that hearers,
upon encountering utterances of E, automatically embed
the utterance's propositional form in S(P). We believe
that this is the right approach. But it might be
thought that proponents of the semantic ellipsis
hypothesis should not be saddled with this particular
view about when expressions have illocutionary force.
To avoid so saddling them, we will proceed as
follows. First, we will consider several syntactic
sentences (that is, maximal projections of an
inflectional element), which do have illocutionary
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force. This will give us an intuitive grasp of the
property which these linguistic representations share.
We will then inquire whether, according to our
understanding, these so-called one-word and one-phrase
sentences exhibit this same property. Our conclusion
will be that they do not. Hence they are not really
semantic sentences at all.
First, however, a word of caution is in order.
The issue will not be whether utterances of these so-
called one-phrase sentences exhibit illocutionary
force. It is a platitude that whenever someone
asserts, commands, or asks their utterance has
illocutionary force. Since it is part of our claim
that these expressions -- whether they turn out to be
words, phrases or sentences -- are commonly used to
make assertions, we of course agree that utterances of
them have illocutionary force; in particular, some have
assertoric force. The question at hand concerns the
expressions, not utterances of them. That is, to
employ some standard vocabulary: we are inquiring about
the properties had by certain linguistic types, not
their tokens. Our conclusion shall be that these
linguistic types do not have illocutionary force.
Here then are some paradigm cases of sentences
161
which do have illocutionary force:
(114) Snow is white
(115) Is John wearing a hat?
(116) Montevideo is the capital of Uruguay
(117) Buy war bonds
Here is our hypothesis: taken apart from any context,
someone who knows English can make an educated guess
about what a speaker of each expression would be doing.
This, we think, is the property which all expressions
with illocutionary force share.
Now let us consider again the examples with which
we began, and inquire whether, independent of extra-
linguistic context, a hearer can form an initial
hypothesis -- an educated first guess -- about the
illocutionary force of utterances of these expressions:
(6) John's father
(7) Nice work
(8) Very fast
(9) From Spain
It is clear that, unless we specify some extra-
linguistic context, knowledge of English does not give
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any idea of what a speaker of these expressions might
be doing -- not even an educated first guess.
The same is true for words and phrases generally:
without knowing something about the extra-linguistic
context, one cannot even form an initial hypothesis
about what act a speaker would be performing by saying
a word or phrase in isolation.
We conclude, therefore, that these expressions do
not have illocutionary force. Hence they are not
semantically elliptical sentences. And they can be
assertorically uttered in isolation. Hence the
semantic ellipsis hypothesis is false.
2.2 Against the Restricted Semantic Ellipsis Hypothesis
Given that (purported) one-word and one-phrase
sentences do not exhibit illocutionary force, let us
weaken the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, leaving out
the condition that these expressions must have
illocutionary force. The result is the restricted
semantic ellipsis hypothesis:
(5 b') The Restricted Semantic Ellipsis Hypothesis:
Whenever a speaker makes an assertion by uttering an
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(apparent) word or phrase in isolation, what that
speaker really utters is an elliptical sentence in the
sense that the semantic type of the linguistic
representation of her utterance is propositional.34
We will now argue that even this restricted
hypothesis is false. Since the original semantic
ellipsis hypothesis entails the restricted semantic
ellipsis hypothesis, the former is false if the latter
is.
2.2.1 Ambiguity
In what follows we will argue that on the
restricted semantic ellipsis hypothesis every word and
phrase which can (apparently) be used in isolation is
multiply ambiguous. Treating these expressions as
multiply ambiguous is implausible on the face of it.
Consider the following contexts in which someone
might say "red".
34 Notice that Dummett's specific claim about assertion is
not salvaged by the restricted semantic ellipsis hypothesis. On
Dummett's specific view, assertion is the utterance of assertoric
sentences; and, to be an assertoric sentence, an expression must
have illocutionary force. (In particular, it must have
assertoric force.) So: if speakers can make assertions by using
expressions that lack illocutionary force, Dummett's (1973)
account is too restrictive.
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First Situation: A doctor is testing her patient
for color blindness. She shows the patient paint
samples, to see which ones he can distinguish. Upon
presenting him with a red paint sample, the patient
(appears to) produce the word "red", thereby asserting
that the displayed paint sample is red.
Second Situation: Several friends are discussing
their favorite thing about life. One says his favorite
thing is Woody Allen movies; another says it is
dancing; still another has an inclination toward ham
salad sandwiches. The most poetic of the group
(appears to) produce the word "red". In so saying, he
asserts that the color red is his favorite thing about
life.
Third Situation: An art dealer is looking over
some new paintings by an abstract artist. The first
ten have been painted entirely in shades of red. He
looks at the next one, looks all around the room, and
complains: "red". Here he might assert that all the
paintings in the room are red.
Fourth Situation: An interior decorator is telling
his client what color he plans to paint the rooms of
the client's house. He walks into the bathroom, and
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says "baby blue". He proceeds into the bedroom and
mumbles "red". What he asserts thereby is that red is
a color he should use in the bedroom.
We believe these four situations illustrate that,
on the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, the purported
semantically elliptical (i.e. one-word) sentence "red"
must be multiply ambiguous.
The four different propositions expressed in the
four described situations cannot result from
indexicality. The logical type of an expression is not
the sort of thing that is context dependent. Even
sentences that contain indexicals do not change from,
say, argiument-predicate to quantificational form just
because of the context.35 Obviously, however, the four
uses of "red" described above do exhibit different
logical types.
The four uses of "red" have the logical types
associated with sentences (118a) through (118d)
35 In standard philosophical argot one would say that these
are propositions which exhibit different propositional forms. To
avoid confusion with Sperber and Wilson's (very different) notion
of propositional form, however, we will instead say that these
propositions are of different logical types. Examples of logical
types include: first order identities (e.g. a=b), second order
identities (e.g. P=R), first order predications (e.g. Pa), second
order predications (e.g. N(P)), first order quantifications (e.g.
Ex(Px)), and so on.
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respectively:
(118)
(a) That paint sample is red
(b) Red is my favorite color
(c) Every painting is red
(d) Red is a color I should use in the bedroom
The sentence (118a) -- and hence the word "red" as
uttered in the first situation -- expresses a
proposition with argument-predicate form, where the
predicate is "red". Its translation in the predicate
calculus would be something like "Red(that-paint-
sample)".
The two propositions communicated by uttering
"red" in the second and third situations do not have
argument-predicate form: one describes an identity,
while the other expresses a universal quantification.
"Red" in the second situation expresses an
identity between properties. This proposition would be
rendered as "Red = My-Favorite-Color" in the predicate
calculus. "Red" in the third situation expresses a
universally quantified proposition. It corresponds to:
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(119) (For every x)[Painting(x) -> Red(x)]
The proposition expressed by sentence (118d) --
and by the word "red" in the fourth situation -- does
have argument-predicate form. But here red is the
argument, not the predicate. Its translation into the
predicate calculus would have the form "Color-I-should-
use-for-the-bedroom(Red)", where "Color-I-should-use-
for-the-bedroom" expresses a second order property.
As we said: the logical type of an expression is
not the sort of thing that is context dependent.
T'herefore, to account for these four different uses of
"red", the semantic ellipsis theorist must admit that
this one-word sentence has at least the following
meanings:
1. The one-word sentence "red" expresses the
proposition that the (contextually specified)
object 0 is red.
2. The one-word sentence "red" expresses the
proposition that the color red has the
(contextually specified) second order property P.
3. The one-word sentence "red" expresses the
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proposition that the color red is numerically
identical to the (contextually specified) property
P.
4. The one-word sentence "red" expresses the
proposition that the (contextually specified)
generalized quantifier <Q,P> applies to the color
red. (E.g. the quantifier <Every, painting>
applies to red).
In short, on the semantic ellipsis hypothesis, the one-
word sentence "red" will be at least four ways
ambiguous. This postulation of meanings is implausible
and ad hoc.
2.2.2 How Many Semantically Elliptical Sentences Are
There?
Suppose that (purported) one-word and one-phrase
sentences were univocal -- a supposition which, we have
argued, could not be true. Would the restricted
semantic ellipsis hypothesis then be plausible? We
think not. The reason is that the semantic ellipsis
hypothesis has the following rather unhappy
consequences:
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(120) If the semantic ellipsis hypothesis is true,
there is a very large class of one-word and one-phrase
sentences, in addition to the infinitely large class of
syntactic sentences and the infinitely large class of
ordinary words and phrases.
(121) If the semantic ellipsis hypothesis is true,
speakers and hearers know the meaning of every
expression in this very large class. (It is this
knowledge which explains their ability to use and
construe (apparent) words and phrases in isolation.)
We do not know how to prove that the class of one-
word and one-phrase sentences is very large. But
consider, for example, this rather lengthy list of
examples. Any of them could be used in isolation to
make an assertion.
(122)
(a) Nice dress
(b) To Cathy, from Santa
(c) A great idea which came from a great thinker
(d) Emergency generator shut-down in Building 20
(e) Black coffee with no sugar
(f) A good talker who knows a lot about literature
(g) Marilyn's portrait from the Steinhem collection
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(h) Another incredibly stupid thing to say
(i) Dinner for seven
(j) My poor baby (Quirk et al 1985: 850)
(k) The door to the left of that blue painting
This is not a happy result. It makes the semantic
ellipsis hypothesis very much less plausible. It is
easy enough to suppose that there are a scattered few
one-word and one-phrase sentences. But if the
proponent of the semantic ellipsis hypothesis is to
handle all possible assertoric utterances of (apparent)
words or phrases, then he must postulate a very large
class of extra formatives; and a corresponding semantic
competence which, as we shall shortly see, does no
explanatory work.
2.2.3 Explanatory Adequacy
No extra explanatory power is achieved by
attributing knowledge of this class of one-word and
one-phrase sentences.
In order to use and construe syntactic sentences -
- that is, Inflectional Phrases -- we need to know the
meaning of ordinary words and phrases. After all, the
meaning of whole sentences is built up from these
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smaller constituents. And, to use and construe
syntactic sentences, we need something like the
pragmatic devices described by Sperber and Wilson.
But, given knowledge of the meaning of ordinary words
and phrases, and limited inferential powers, a speaker
who was aiming for optimal relevance could assert; and,
given knowledge of the meaning of ordinary words and
phrases, a hearer who took her interlocutor to be
aiming for optimal relevance could interpret utterances
of ordinary words and phrases as assertions.
In a word: any speaker who is able to use
syntactic sentences to make assertions can, ipso facto,
use words and phrases in isolation to make assertions;
and any hearer who is able to construe utterances of
syntactic sentences as assertions can, ipso facto,
construe utterances of (ordinary) words and phrases as
assertions. No extra knowledge is required. Hence
attributing knowledge of the class of one-word
sentences and one-phrase sentences explains nothing
that is not already explained without positing this
knowledge. This holds true, of course, regardless of
the size of class of one-word and one-phrase sentences,
and regardless of whether the members of this class are
ambiguous or univocal.
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Take an example. It is true enough that an
individual who assigned the proposition that the
salient object is red to thi purported one-word
sentence "red" would be able to use this expression to
assert, e.g., that the demonstrated paint sample is
red. And, if this person heard an utterance of "red",
he would be able to construe it as an assertion that
the contextually salient object was red.
But these same abilities would be exhibited by a
person who was able to use and construe syntactic
sentences containing the word "red" -- even if his
idiolect did not contain the one-word sentence "red".
So, positing knowledge of this one-word sentence
achieves nothing: a person who had this knowledge would
demonstrate the same abilities as a minimally different
person who lacked it.
As will become clear in Chapter Five, we can
explain our ability to communicate with words and
phrases by appealing to relevance theory and the
semantics of ordinary words and phrases; both of which
are independently required to explain our ability to
communicate with syntactic sentences. We therefore do
not need to introduce semantically elliptical sentences
to explain the use and construal of words and phrases
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in isolation. And semantically elliptical sentences
serve no other explanatory purpose. Hence we should
not postulate them.
To sum up: to circumvent the issues raised in
Chapter One, it may be suggested that what one hears in
conversation are not really words and phrases in
isolation; rather, what one hears are semantic
sentences. Though not syntactically sentences, they
are "one-word" or "one-phrase" sentence in the sense
that they express propositions. This idea is
unsatisfactory because (a) it leads to an implausible
multiplication of ambiguities; and (b) it is committed
to linguistic knowledge of an enormous set of
expressions -- knowledge that would be redundant.
3 Conclusion
Having now rejected both the syntactic and
semantic ellipsis hypothesis, we conclude that speakers
not only app i to assert by uttering words and phrases
in isolation; they actually do assert by uttering words
and phrases in isolation. And, what speakers actually
do, speakers can do. Hence, the Thesis is correct:
(1) The Thesis: Speakers can make assertions by
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uttering ordinary words and phrases in isolation.
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CHAPTER FIVE: A NON-SENTENTIAL ASSERTION
For every affirmation, it seems, is
either true or false; but of things
said without any combination none
is either true or false (e.g.
'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins').(Aristotle, Categories, IV, 10a)
1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters we argued for the Thesis
(and against the Counter Thesis) on the grounds that
speakers actually do make assertions using words and
phrases in isolation. In this chapter we will argue
for the Thesis by showing that if relevance theory is
correct (indeed, if any theory appropriately like
relevance theory is correct -- see Chapter Two), then
speakers are able to assert by uttering ordinary words
and phrases; regardless of whether they actually do
make assertions in this way.
The argument runs as follows. We start with a
single example -- the phrase "John's father". We
employ relevance theory to show that a typical speaker
is able to use "John's father" in isolation to make a
particular assertion. Specifically, we show that:
(123) The Possibility Premise: A typical speaker is
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able to use the ordinary phrase "John's father" in
isolation to assert that the man near the door is the
man who fathered John Adams.
From the possibility premise it follows that a
typical speaker is able to use at least one ordinary
word or phrase in isolation to make at least one
assertion. This refutes the Counter Thesis.
But, of course, the very same arguments which
establish the possibility premise with respect to
"John's father" apply, mutatis mutandis, to a multitude
of ordinary words and phrases. Hence we can
generalize: a typical speaker is able to use ordinary
words and phrases in isolation to make assertions.
Let us stress: the truth of the possibility
premise is not dependent upon whether any speaker ever
has or ever will use the ordinary phrase "John's
father" in isolation to make an assertion. The
possibility premise concerns the actions speakers are
able to perform by uttering the ordinary phrase "John's
father"; not the actions (if any) speakers actually
have or will perform by uttering this phrase.
Indeed, the possibility premise could be true even
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if no actual speaker has ever made a non-sentential
assertion; it could happen that a typical speaker has
the ability to make assertions using "John's father"
(and other words and phrases), but that all actual
speakers choose not to exercise this ability.
Our demonstration of the possibility premise will
take place in two steps. In the first step we use
relevance theory to show that, given the right
circumstances, a typical speaker is able to communicate
the proposition in (124) -- hereafter referred to as JF
-- by uttering the ordinary phrase "John's father" in
isolation.
(124) JF: The man near the door is the father of John
Adams
In the second step, we introduce a slightly
modified version of Sperber and Wilson's (1986)
definition of assertion. Applying this definition to
our example, we show that a typical speaker can assert
-- not merely communicate, but assert -- JF by uttering
"John's father" in isolation.
As we said: this argument can be applied, mutatis
mutandis, to any number of words and phrases. We
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therefore conclude that the Thesis is true not just for
this case, but for a multitude of ordinary words and
phrases.
2 Step One: Communication
As we saw in Chapter Two, an interpretation of an
utterance is communicated if it is consistent with the
presumption of optimal relevance, repeated here in
simplified form:
(125) Presumption of Optimal Relevance:
(a) The interpretation is relevant enough to make it
worth the addressee's while to process the utterance.
(b) The utterance is the most relevant one the
communicator could have used to communicate the
proposition in question.
Applied to our example, an utterance of "John's
father" communicates JF if:
(a) JF is relevant enough to make it worth the
addressee's while to process the utterance of "John's
father"
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(b) The utterance of "John's father" is the most
relevant one the communicator could have used to
communicate JF
In what follows we will argue that, in at least
one possible context C, conditions (a) and (b) are
jointly satisfied. This conclusion is important
because if it is possible for these two conditions to
be jointly met, then it is possible for JF to be
communicated by an utterance of "John's father". And
if it is possible for an utterance of "John's father"
to communicate JF, then it is possible for a typical
speaker to communicate JF by uttering "John's father".
This is the conclusion of step one.
2.1 Relevance
There are contexts in which interpreting an
utterance of "John's father" as communicating JF would
require comparatively little processing effort: the
interpreter would only need to (a) complete the Logical
Form of the utterance and (b) access one very manifest
Logical Form. We shall shortly explain why this is so.
We begin by noting some important facts about the
context C within which the utterance is to be imagined:
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Two people are talking at a party. Mary points to a
man near the door and says "John's father".
Furthermore, someone was recently talking about John
Adams. Given this, the completion of the Logical Form
of the utterance (i.e. [NP John's father]) in C is sure
to be (126).
(126) [NP The man who fathered John Adams]
That is: reference would be assigned such that the
speaker is referring to John Adams, who was just
mentioned, and not John Baker -- who no one has thought
about for ten years. Also, in the described situation,
the genitive case marker would be enriched such that
"John's father" refers not the father who John brought
along to new members night at the Association of
Fathers, nor to the father who John "purchased" for the
evening at a charity auction. Rather, [NP John's
father] would be enriched so that it refers to the man
who actually fathered John. Again: [,N John's father]
would be enriched in this way because, in these
circumstances, this reading is more accessible than any
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other.
So: the completed Logical Form of the utterance,
in these circumstances, would be [Np The man who
fathered John Adams]. So far, very little processing
effort has been expended.
Of course this is not yet what we are after: we
want to show that, in these circumstances, the
utterance of "John's father" is relevant enough. And
the Logical Form (126), even completed, cannot be
relevant enough because it cannot be relevant. Only
assumptions can be relevant, and [NP The man who
fathered John Adams] is not an assumption.
Recall, however, Sperber and Wilson's definition
of manifestness: a Logical Form is manifest to an
individual if it is inferable, retrievable from memory
or perceivable in the physical environment. (See
Sperber and Wilson 1986: 81ff for discussion.)
According to this definition, Logical Forms of all the
following semantic types can be manifest -- because
they can be perceived or retrieved from memory.
(127) Logical Forms of semantic type one: Logical Forms
that express individual concepts
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(128) Logical Forms of semantic type two: Logical Forms
that express properties
(129) Logical Forms of semantic type three: Logical
Forms that express generalized quantifiers, where a
generalized quantifier is a function from properties to
propositions
(130) Assumptions: Logical Forms that express
propositions
Returning to our example, the following assumption
schema -- which is a Logical Form of semantic type two
-- would be very manifest to the hearer H in C, because
the speaker is pointing at the man near the door.
(131) [The man near the door is x]
And JF results from conjoining this formative with
the completed Logical Form of the utterance. So: H,
the hearer, can arrive at JF by merely completing the
Logical Form of the utterance, and accessing the very
manifest Logical Form in (131). This is indeed
comparatively little processing effort.
It is safe to assume that, in some context C, JF
would have sufficient contextual effects to make this
small amount of processing effort worth while. That
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is: there is surely some context or other such that JF
could be usefully added to that context, or such that
JF would provide further evidence for some assumptions
already in that context, or such that JF would remove
some assumption from that context. Hence condition (a)
of the presumption of optimal relevance is met in at
least one context C:
(a) JF is relevant enough to make it worth the
addressee's while to process the utterance of "John's
father"
But is condition (b) met in C as well?
(b) The utterance of "John's father" is the most
relevant one the communicator could have used to
communicate JF.
2.2 Optimal Relevance
Recall that the most relevant utterance is the one
which (a) communicates the set of propositions {I}
while (b) requiring the least processing effort on the
part of the hearer. But is there not another utterance
which would communicate that the man near the door is
John's father, and which would require less effort on
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the hearer's part than an utterance of (6), namely
(132)?
(132) The man near the door is John's father
There are two questions worth raising here. On
the one hand: would an utterance of (132) and (6)
really have the same contextual effects in the same
context? On the other hand: would an utterance of
(132) really require less processing effort than an
utterance of (6)? As Sperber and Wilson (1986: 202)
write:
It might seem that two utterances with the
same linguistically determined truth
conditions must have identical contextual
effects. [We believe that], on the contrary,
they may differ both in their contextual
effects and in the processing effort they
require, and that this is the key to an
explanatory theory of style.
2.2.1 Contextual Effects
The style which a speaker adopts inevitably
carries information about her relationship to the
hearer, what she takes the hearer to know or believe,
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her personality (e.g. does the speaker lean to formal
and dignified, or casual and unceremonious
communication?), and so on. As Sperber and Wilson
explain,
From the style of a communication it is
possible to infer such things as what the
speaker takes to be the hearer's cognitive
capacities and level of attention, how much
help or guidance she is prepared to give him
in processing her utterance, the degree of
complicity between them, their emotional
closeness or distance. In other words, a
speaker not only aims to enlarge the mutual
cognitive environment she shares with the
hearer; she also assumes a certain degree of
mutuality, which is indicated, and sometimes
communicated, by her style. (Sperber and
Wilson 1986: 217-218)
Applied to our example, we see that an utterance
of "John's father" has different contextual effects
than an utterance of "The man near the door is John's
father". Given the right circumstances, uttering the
former might indicate that the style is informal, that
the speaker and hearer can take a familiar tone with
one another, that the speaker is relying on the hearer
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to do some extra inferential work, and so on.
In general, uttering a word or phrase has
different stylistic effects than uttering a sentence.
The differences may be communicated. Or they may
merely be registered by the hearer. (I.e. the hearer
may receive extra contextual effects, without it being
manifest that the speaker intended to make it manifest,
etc.) Hence it simply is not true that utterances of
(6) and (132) will inevitably have the same contextual
effects in the same circumstances.
2.2.2 Processing Effort
How much processing effort an utterance requires
is an empirical question about which we can only
speculate. Nevertheless, we hope to show that there is
no reason to believe that interpreting (6) requires
more processing effort than interpreting (132), given
the same circumstances. On the contrary, there are
some reasons for thinking that, in the circumstances
described, (6) requires the least processing effort of
the two.
As Sperber and Wilson claim,
A speaker aiming at optimal relevance will
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leave implicit everything her hearer can be
trusted to supply with less effort than would
be needed to process an explicit prompt.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986: 218)
Let us look closely at our example. Sentence
(132) contains more words than (6); words which need to
be disambiguated, enriched and assigned reference. Is
"man" to be taken as human being -- as in "earth man" -
- or as male human being? In saying "the man", which
man is the speaker referring to? Is "near" to be taken
as near for two planets, near for two cities, near for
a missed target, or near for two medium sized physical
objects? And so on.
Discovering the propositional form of an utterance
of the more explicit (132) may, therefore, require more
processing effort than discovering the completed
Logical Form of utterances of (6) and conjoining it
with some formative; e.g. the very manifest Logical
Form [The man near the door is x]. It may happen,
given the right circumstances, that a speaker aiming at
optimal relevance should leave the Logical Form [the
man near the door is x] implicit, because the hearer
can be trusted to discover [The man near the door is x]
and connect it to [John's father] with less effort than
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would be needed to process the explicit prompt "The man
near the door is John's father".
2.3 Summary
According to Sperber and Wilson, an utterance of
"John's father" communicates JF if:
(a) JF is relevant enough to make it worth the
addressee's while to process the utterance of "John's
father"
(b) The utterance of "John's father" is the most
relevant one the communicator could have used to
communicate JF
It is reasonable to suppose that there is at least
one context in which both of these conditions obtain.
If this is true, then an utterance of "John's father"
can communicate JF:
(124) JF: The man near the door is the man who fathered
John Adams
Of course if an utterance of "John's father" can
communicate JF, then a typical speaker could use the
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ordinary phrase "John's father" in isolation to
communicate JF. This is the conclusion of step one.
what remains, in order to establish the
possibility premise, is to show that a typical speaker
is able not only to communicate JF by uttering "John's
father" in isolation; he can actually assert it.
(123) The Possibility Premise: A typical speaker is
able to use the ordinary phrase "John's father" in
isolation to assert that the man near the door is the
man who fathered John Adams.
3 Step Two: Assertion
3.1 Assertion Defined
When is a proposition asserted, and not merely
communicated? According to Sperber and Wilson, an
utterance is an assertion if the proposition it
communicates is the propositional form of the
utterance.36 (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 181)
36 Evans (1982) espouses roughly the same idea, though he
puts it differently. Evans says that a proposition is asserted
if it is expressed, in the circumstances of use, by the words
used.
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A quick review of the notion of propositional
form: An utterance U has a propositional form P just
in case P is a completion of U's Logical Form L -- i.e.
P results from assigning reference to all indexicals in
L, disambiguating L and enriching L. Consider an
example. Mary utters (133).
(133) He is at the bank
The propositional form [John is at the river bank] is a
possible propositional form of Mary's utterance,
because it could result simply from assigning John as
the reference of the pronoun "he" and disambiguating
the word "bank" as meaning river bank. Another
possible propositional form of this utterance is [Steve
is at the money lending institution]. Again: this
propositional form could result simply by assigning
Steve as the reference of "he" and money lending
institution as the appropriate reading of "bank".
Most utterances have many possible propositional
forms, because there are usually many different ways
that the Logical Form of the utterance can be filled
in."37 In contrast, there are infinitely many
3 However: where communication is successful, utterances
have only one actual propositional form. The propositional form
which the utterance actually has is that unique possible
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propositional forms which any given utterance could not
have. These are the propositional forms which cannot
result merely from filling in the utterance's Logical
Form.
The propositional form [The king is dead], for
example, is not a possible propositional form of Mary's
utterance, because there is no way to complete the
Logical Form [He is at the bank] to arrive at this
propositional form. This is true despite that fact
that, given the right circumstances, someone might
communicate that the king is dead by saying "He is at
the bank".38
Given this notion of the propositional form of an
utterance, we can spell out Sperber and Wilson's
definition of assertion.
(134) Definition of Assertion: An utterance U is an
assertion that P if and only if:
(a) P is the propositional form of U (I.e. P results
propositional form which is consistent with the presumption of
optimal relevance.
38 Imagine that the propositional form of Mary's utterance
is actually [John is at the river bank]. Suppose further that it
is manifest to both Mary and her interlocutor that John would not
go near the river bank unless the king were dead. In these
circumstances, Mary might well communicate that the king is dead
by saying "He is at the bank".
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merely by completing the Logical Form of U -- by
disambiguating it, enriching it and assigning it
reference)
(b) P is consistent with the presumption of optimal
relevance (I.e. U actually conmmunicates P)
3.2 Revising the Definition
This definition, as it stands, leaves out
assertions made with words and phrases in isolation.
Here is the problem.
According to Sperber and Wilson's definition, an
utterance U is an assertion if and only if the
assumption communicated by U is identical to the
propositional form of U. But the assumption
communicated by an utterance of an ordinary word or
phrase cannot be identical to the propositional form of
that utterance since the latter cannot be
propositional, while the former must be propositional.
The "propositional form" -- or, more accurately,
the COMPLETED LOGICAL FORM (LF-C(U)) -- of a lexical or
phrasal utterance is inevitably of semantic type one,
two or three; that is, the Logical Form of an ordinary
word or phrase, even when completed, expresses either
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an individual concept, a property or a generalized
quantifier. Such a Logical Form can, of course, never
be identical to the assumption communicated.
Therefore, no utterance of an ordinary word or phrase
can be an assertion -- according to Sperber and
Wilson's definition.
To include utterances of ordinary words and
phrases as assertions, we must amend Sperber and
Wilson's definition as follows:
(135) Definition of Assertion (Revised): An utterance U
is an assertion that P if and only if:
(a) Either P is the propositional form of U (I.e. P
results merely by completing the Logical Form of U --
i.e. by disambiguating it, enriching it and assigning
it reference) or P could result merely by completing
the Logical Form of U and conjoining it with another
manifest Logical Form of the appropriate semantic type
(b) P is consistent with the presumption of optimal
relevance (I.e. U actually communicates P).
Hence:
(a) Where the Completed Logical Form expresses an
Individual Concept: If LF-C(U) expresses an individual
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concept and there is a manifest Logical Form LF' that
expresses a property, and LF-C(U) conjoins with LF' to
yield the proposition that is communicated, then U is
an assertion.
(b) Where the Completed Logical Form expresses a
Property: If LF-C(U) expresses a property and there is
either a manifest Logical Form LF' that expresses an
individual concept, or a manifest Logical Form LF''
that expresses a second order property, or a manifest
Logical Form LF"''' that expresses a generalized
quantifier, and LF-C(U) conjoins with LF', LF" or
LF"' to yield the proposition communicated, then U is
an assertion.
(c) Where the Completed Logical Form expresses a
Generalized Quantifier: If LF-C(U) expresses a
generalized quantifier and there is a manifest Logical
Form LF' that expresses a property, and LF-C(U)
conjoins with LF' to yield the proposition
communicated, then U is an assertion.
Let us now apply this definition to our example of
"John's father". We saw that:
(a) The proposition that the man near the door is the
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man who fathered John results merely by completing the
Logical Form of the utterance of "John's father" --
yielding (126) -- and conjoining it with another
manifest Logical Form of the appropriate semantic type;
namely, the Logical Form (131).
(126) [The man who fathered John Adams]
(131) [The man near the door is x]
(b) The proposition that the man near the door is the
man who fathered John is, by hypothesis, consistent
with the presumption of optimal relevance. (I.e. the
utterance of "John's father" actually communicates this
proposition.)
Therefore, according to our revised definition of
assertion, a speaker who uttered "John's father" in the
circumstances described would assert that the man near
the door is John's father. So the possibility premise
is true:
(123) The Possibility Premise: A typical speaker is
able to use the ordinary phrase "John's father" in
isolation to assert that the man near the door is the
man who fathered John Adams.
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The possibility premise on its own refutes the
Counter Thesis. But notice: there is nothing odd or
special about the phrase "John's father". The
arguments in this chapter would work equally well for
any of the words or phrases below, and many more --
mutatis mutandis, of course.
(136)
(a) An emergency generator shutdown
(b) Another scoop of ice cream
(c) At the house of the seven gables
(d) To my dearest wife of many years, from your loving
husband
(e) Coffee, black, with seven lumps of sugar
(f) Of all the stupid things to say (Quirk et al 1985:
850)
We conclude, therefore, that speakers are able to
assertorically utter a multitude of ordinary words and
phrases -- regardless of whether they actually do so.
Hence the Thesis is correct.39
39 It might be noticed that, while the Thesis makes a claim
about speakers, the possibility premise makes a claim about a
typical speaker. This does not pose a problem, however, since
the word "speakers" in the Thesis refers to typical speakers
only. (We might need to exclude severely retarded speakers, for
example, for whom the inferences described might prove
impossible.)
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4 Conclusions: Words, Phrases and Philosophy (Again)
We have argued that the Thesis and its Corollary
are true.
(1) The Thesis: Speakers can make assertions by
uttering ordinary words and phrases in isolation.
(20) The Corollary: Words and phrases have a meaning in
isolation.
As we saw in Chapter One, this spells trouble for
Dummett's (1973) convention based analysis of
assertion, Evans' (1982) principle, Frege's (1978)
context principle and Russell's (1919) theory of
descriptions.
According to Dummett (1973):
(14) Convention Based Analysis of Assertion: A speaker
S makes an assertion that P if and only if:
a. S utters an assertoric sentence whose sense is P
b. The conventionally specified conditions C for making
an assertion obtain.
Ordinary words and phrases are not assertoric
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sentences. Nevertheless, we have argued, a speaker can
make an assertion by saying a word or phrase in
isolation. Therefore, Dummett's convention based
analysis of assertion is too restrictive.
Evans' principle is also mistaken.
(18) Evans' Principle: An expression E is suitable for
asserting that P only if, in the circumstances of use,
E expresses the thought that P.
The reason: ordinary words and phrases do not
express thoughts, no matter what the circumstances of
use. What words and phrases express, in the
circumstances of use, are individual concepts,
properties or generalized quantifiers. Yet, as we have
shown, words and phrases are "suitable" for making
assertions.
Frege's context principle faces trouble as well --
at least on the syntactic and semantic construals of it
-- since ordinary words and phrases in isolation are
meaningful.
(29) The Syntactic Construal: It is only in the context
of an expression that has a subject and inflected verb
200
that a word has a meaning.
(30) The Semantic Construal: It is only in the context
of a formative capable of expressing a proposition that
a word has a meaning.
Finally: according to Russell's theory of
descriptions, descriptions are symbols which are not
constituents in any proposition. And, according to
Russell's principle of significance, if a symbol or
group of symbols is not a constituent in some
proposition, then it has no significance. Therefore,
if the theory of descriptions and the principle of
significance were both correct, descriptions would have
no significance. But, as we saw, descriptions do have
significance. Hence either the theory of descriptions
is false, or the principle of significance is false, or
both are false.
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